Chip Security Act
- Bill Number
- S. 1705
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- Foreign Trade and International Finance
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-05-08: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
- Last Updated
- 2026-06-24T11:03:28Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose of the Legislation
The Chip Security Act aims to enhance the security of advanced integrated circuits (commonly known as chips) exported from the United States by requiring built-in security features. These features help prevent theft, unauthorized use, smuggling, or tampering, thereby supporting U.S. national security, foreign policy goals, and compliance with export laws. It promotes U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence and computing technology while enabling safer sharing of advanced tech with allies and partners.
Key Provisions
- Sense of Congress: Expresses congressional views that U.S.-developed technology should lead global AI efforts, protect exports from misuse, and use security features to improve detection of illegal activities, allowing for more flexible exports to trusted partners.
- Definitions:
- Chip security mechanism: Any software, firmware, hardware, or physical feature designed to secure chips.
- Covered integrated circuit product: Specific high-tech chips, computers, or products containing them classified under certain export control numbers (e.g., 3A090 or 3A001.z), or similar future classifications. These are advanced items with national security implications.
- Other terms include "export," "reexport," "in-country transfer" (movement within a foreign country), and references to the Secretary of Commerce.
- Primary Requirements for Security Mechanisms (Section 4(a)):
- Within 180 days of enactment, the Secretary of Commerce must require all covered products to include chip security mechanisms for location verification before export, reexport, or in-country transfer abroad. These must use feasible and appropriate techniques available at the time.
- License holders (those authorized to export) must report to the Under Secretary of Industry and Security if they learn of credible evidence of diversion (e.g., wrong location, unauthorized user, or tampering attempts like disabling location tracking).
- Secondary Requirements for Security Mechanisms (Section 4(b)):
- Within 1 year, the Secretary (with input from the Secretary of Defense) must assess and potentially develop additional mechanisms to boost export law compliance, prevent unauthorized access, detect smuggling, and meet other security goals.
- The assessment covers feasibility of anti-tampering methods, workload verification (ensuring chips are used as intended), functionality changes for illicitly acquired items, costs/benefits, and risks of new vulnerabilities.
- A report to Congress (unclassified with possible classified annex) must outline findings and an implementation roadmap.
- If approved, secondary mechanisms must be required within 2 years of the assessment, prioritizing user privacy and confidentiality.
- Enforcement Authority (Section 4(c)):
- The Secretary can verify product ownership and location, maintain records of exported items (including end-users), and require license holders to provide data for these records.
- Annual Assessments and Reports (Section 4(d)):
- Starting 2 years after enactment, and annually for 3 years, the Secretary (with Defense) must evaluate new security mechanisms and report to Congress on whether they should update existing requirements or allow more export flexibility to certain countries.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
This bill builds on the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (which regulates sensitive tech exports for national security) by introducing mandatory security standards for covered products. Key changes include:
- New requirement for built-in location verification and potential anti-tampering features on exported chips, not previously mandated.
- Expanded reporting obligations for exporters on diversions or tampering.
- Ongoing assessments and updates to security standards, creating a dynamic framework rather than static rules.
- Potential for relaxed export controls to allies if security features are in place, promoting innovation while tightening protections against adversaries.
No direct amendments to prior laws are specified, but it integrates with existing export licensing processes.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Department of Commerce (e.g., developing standards, maintaining records, enforcement) and Department of Defense (coordination on assessments). Could improve monitoring efficiency and reduce smuggling investigations.
- Citizens and Businesses: U.S. tech companies may face higher production costs for security features, potentially raising prices for consumers of electronics or computing devices. However, it could enhance U.S. competitiveness by protecting intellectual property and enabling more secure global trade.
- International Relations: Strengthens ties with allies by allowing safer, larger shipments of advanced tech, fostering goodwill and joint AI research. May deter adversaries (e.g., through better detection of theft) but could strain relations with countries facing stricter export scrutiny. Overall, supports U.S. foreign policy by positioning American tech as a secure global standard.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Government: Department of Commerce (lead role in standards and enforcement), Department of Defense (assessment support), and congressional committees (Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in Senate; Foreign Affairs in House) for oversight.
- Tech Industry: Manufacturers and exporters of integrated circuits and computing hardware (e.g., semiconductor firms like Intel or NVIDIA), who must comply with new security requirements and reporting.
- Foreign Entities: U.S. allies and partners (benefit from secure tech access); potential adversaries or smugglers (face higher barriers to unauthorized use).
- General Public: Indirectly affected through impacts on tech supply chains, innovation, and national security.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Reinforces export control enforcement without creating new criminal penalties, but expands administrative powers (e.g., record-keeping) under existing laws. Privacy prioritization in secondary mechanisms addresses potential data collection concerns, though implementation details could invite legal challenges if seen as overly intrusive.
- Constitutional: No apparent conflicts; aligns with Congress's authority over foreign commerce and national security (Article I, Section 8). Enforcement relies on executive agencies, maintaining separation of powers.
- Political: Signals bipartisan emphasis on U.S. tech supremacy amid global competition (e.g., with China), potentially influencing trade negotiations. Could spark debate on balancing security with industry burdens or export flexibility, but the bill's focus on allies may garner support for advancing U.S. strategic interests without broad isolationism.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (21)
Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH], Sen. Lummis, Cynthia M. [R-WY], Sen. Schatz, Brian [D-HI], Sen. Banks, Jim [R-IN], Sen. Ricketts, Pete [R-NE], Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA], Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE], Sen. Hawley, Josh [R-MO], Sen. Warren, Elizabeth [D-MA], Sen. Cramer, Kevin [R-ND], Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV], Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA], Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC], Sen. Tuberville, Tommy [R-AL], Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD], Sen. Kelly, Mark [D-AZ], Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI], Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY], Sen. Moody, Ashley [R-FL], Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO], Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
Recent Actions
- 2025-05-08: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
- 2025-05-08: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Chip Security Act — issued 2025-05-08 — PDF (12 pages)