Chip Security Act
- Bill Number
- H.R. 3447
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- Foreign Trade and International Finance
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2026-03-26: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 0.
- Last Updated
- 2026-06-05T08:07:24Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose of the Legislation
The Chip Security Act (H.R. 3447) aims to enhance the security of advanced U.S.-made integrated circuits (commonly known as chips) used in computing and artificial intelligence. It requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish standards for built-in security features to prevent theft, diversion, tampering, or unauthorized use during exports. This supports U.S. national security, foreign policy goals, and alliances by ensuring exported technology remains protected while allowing safer sharing with trusted partners.
Key Provisions
- Sense of Congress: Expresses that U.S. technology should lead global AI development, promote goodwill through secure exports to allies, and protect against risks like smuggling. Security features are seen as improving export law compliance and enabling more flexible international shipments.
- Definitions:
- Chip security mechanism: Any software, firmware, hardware, or physical feature designed to secure chips.
- Covered integrated circuit product: Specific high-tech chips, computers, or products containing them classified under certain Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs, which are codes used to categorize items for export controls, like 3A090 for advanced semiconductors).
- Other terms (e.g., export, reexport, in-country transfer) align with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), a law regulating sensitive technology exports.
- Primary Requirements (Effective 180 Days After Enactment):
- All covered products must include location verification technology (e.g., tracking where the chip is) before being exported, reexported (sent to another country after initial export), or transferred within a foreign country.
- Exporters with licenses must report any credible evidence of diversion (e.g., wrong location or user) or tampering (e.g., attempts to disable tracking) to the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
- Secondary Requirements (Assessment Within 1 Year; Implementation Within 2 Years If Approved):
- The Secretary must evaluate additional security features, such as anti-tampering tools, workload verification (ensuring the chip is used as intended), or ways to disable illicitly acquired chips.
- The assessment considers feasibility, costs, benefits, and risks like new vulnerabilities.
- A report to Congress (the Senate Banking Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee) includes findings and an implementation plan; privacy protections are prioritized.
- If approved, these features become mandatory for exports.
- Enforcement Tools:
- The Secretary can verify product locations/ownership, maintain a database of exported items (including end-users), and require exporters to provide data for it.
- Ongoing Reviews (Starting 2 Years After Enactment, Annually for 3 Years):
- Assess new security technologies and report to Congress on whether they should update requirements.
- Recommend export control adjustments for more flexibility (e.g., easier shipments to allies) if enhanced security is in place.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Builds on the ECRA by mandating specific technology integrations (e.g., location tracking and anti-tampering) for certain exports, which are not currently required.
- Introduces new reporting obligations for exporters on diversions or tampering, plus government record-keeping and annual technology reviews.
- Shifts from purely regulatory oversight to proactive security embedding in products, potentially allowing relaxed controls for secure exports to partners.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Department of Commerce (especially BIS) in developing standards, conducting assessments, enforcing rules, and maintaining databases. Congressional committees gain more oversight through reports.
- Citizens: Minimal direct effects, but could indirectly support U.S. tech jobs and innovation by securing exports and reducing risks from foreign exploitation. Privacy concerns may arise from tracking features, though the bill emphasizes confidentiality.
- International Relations: Strengthens alliances by enabling safer, larger shipments of advanced tech to partners, fostering goodwill and joint AI research. It counters adversaries (e.g., by detecting smuggling), potentially reducing tensions over technology access while promoting U.S. leadership in global standards.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Government: Department of Commerce (lead implementer); congressional committees on banking and foreign affairs (oversight role).
- Tech and Export Industries: Chip manufacturers (e.g., semiconductor firms) and exporters must integrate and report on security features, facing compliance costs but potential benefits from streamlined ally exports.
- Allies and Partners: Gain easier access to secure U.S. computing hardware, supporting their innovation and defense without heightened risks.
- Adversaries or Unauthorized Users: Face barriers to diverting or tampering with U.S. tech, limiting their ability to exploit it for military or economic gain.
- End-Users Abroad: Licensed buyers (e.g., companies or governments) must adhere to location/use rules, with added scrutiny.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Expands ECRA's scope by tying export licenses to technology mandates, potentially leading to enforcement challenges or lawsuits over feasibility/costs. Privacy prioritization addresses data protection laws, but implementation details could invite scrutiny under laws like the Administrative Procedure Act (which governs federal rulemaking).
- Constitutional: Relies on Congress's powers over foreign commerce and national security (Article I, Section 8), aligning with executive authority in export controls. No direct conflicts noted, but tracking features might raise Fourth Amendment concerns if applied domestically (though the bill focuses on exports).
- Political: Bipartisan sponsorship (from both parties) highlights consensus on tech security amid U.S.-China competition. It balances national security with innovation by promoting flexible exports to allies, but could spark debates on industry burdens versus protection benefits. The unclassified reports with optional classified annexes ensure transparency while safeguarding sensitive info.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (39)
Rep. Foster, Bill [D-IL-11], Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2], Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8], Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1], Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36], Rep. LaHood, Darin [R-IL-16], Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17], Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32], Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6], Rep. Harder, Josh [D-CA-9], Rep. Tokuda, Jill N. [D-HI-2], Rep. Harrigan, Pat [R-NC-10], Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23], Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1], Rep. McClain Delaney, April [D-MD-6], Rep. Carter, John R. [R-TX-31], Rep. Dunn, Neal P. [R-FL-2], Rep. Veasey, Marc A. [D-TX-33], Rep. Carson, André [D-IN-7], Rep. Stefanik, Elise M. [R-NY-21], Rep. Cohen, Steve [D-TN-9], Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7], Rep. Cherfilus-McCormick, Sheila [D-FL-20], Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12], Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3], Rep. Case, Ed [D-HI-1], Rep. Fleischmann, Charles J. "Chuck" [R-TN-3], Rep. Moran, Nathaniel [R-TX-1], Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7], Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6], Rep. Landsman, Greg [D-OH-1], Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6], Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6], Rep. Kiggans, Jennifer A. [R-VA-2], Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2], Rep. Messmer, Mark B. [R-IN-8], Rep. Fuller, Clay [R-GA-14], Rep. Whitesides, George [D-CA-27]
Recent Actions
- 2026-03-26: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 0.
- 2026-03-26: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
- 2025-05-15: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- 2025-05-15: Introduced in House
- 2025-05-15: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- Chip Security Act — issued 2025-05-15 — PDF (12 pages)