SHIELD Against CCP Act
- Bill Number
- S. 1625
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- Immigration
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-05-06: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
- Last Updated
- 2025-11-30T06:48:28Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The legislation aims to create a specialized working group within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify, assess, and counter security threats to the United States from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These threats include terrorism, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security, with a focus on nontraditional tactics like immigration exploitation, economic crimes, drug trafficking support, and money laundering.
Key Provisions
- Establishment of the Working Group: Within 180 days of enactment, the DHS Secretary must form the "Working Group" led by a Director who reports directly to the Secretary. It will include sufficient staff, at least one privacy compliance expert, and temporary experts (detailees) from intelligence agencies or other federal bodies.
- Core Duties:
- Review and report on DHS efforts to counter CCP threats, including exploitation of immigration (e.g., identity theft, visa fraud, smuggling), economic crimes (e.g., counterfeit goods, forced labor, intellectual property theft), support for fentanyl and drug trafficking via borders or mail, and money laundering by Chinese-linked groups.
- Track DHS resources dedicated to these threats and evaluate program effectiveness.
- Incorporate findings from existing DHS evaluations to avoid duplication.
- Identify policy and process gaps in DHS responses.
- Promote coordination across DHS offices for a unified approach.
- Information Sharing: The group will collaborate with DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to gather and share threat information with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial partners, and the National Network of Fusion Centers (decentralized hubs for sharing homeland security intelligence).
- Annual Assessments: For five years starting 180 days after enactment, DHS must submit unclassified reports (with optional classified addendums) to specified congressional committees, assessing CCP threats from the prior year. Unclassified parts will be posted publicly on a DHS website. A briefing on each report and the group's progress must follow within 30 days.
- Oversight and Support:
- The Government Accountability Office (Comptroller General) will review implementation one year after enactment.
- Within one year, DHS must conduct research and development (R&D), including testing, for technologies to improve security against these threats, in coordination with DHS's science and technology office.
- Safeguards and Duration: All activities must respect constitutional rights, privacy laws, civil rights, and civil liberties, without limiting free speech for U.S. persons (individuals or entities under U.S. jurisdiction). The group sunsets (ends) seven years after establishment.
- Definitions: Clarifies terms like "appropriate congressional committees" (e.g., House and Senate panels on homeland security, finance, judiciary, and foreign affairs), "fusion centers," "intelligence community," and "U.S. persons."
Significant Changes to Existing Law
This bill introduces a new entity (the Working Group) and mandates specific processes, such as annual threat assessments and R&D focused on CCP threats, which do not appear to directly amend prior laws. It builds on existing frameworks like the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (for fusion centers) and the National Security Act of 1947 (for intelligence definitions) but adds targeted requirements for coordination, reporting, and privacy compliance without altering core statutes.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Enhances DHS's ability to coordinate internal efforts and share intelligence with partners, potentially improving resource allocation and threat detection. It may increase workload for DHS, the FBI, and national intelligence offices through required reports and briefings. State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies could benefit from better information access via fusion centers.
- Citizens: Could strengthen protections against immigration fraud, cyber threats, drug trafficking, and economic crimes linked to the CCP, reducing risks to public safety and the economy. Privacy-focused staffing aims to minimize civil liberties intrusions.
- International Relations: By spotlighting CCP-specific threats, it may heighten U.S. scrutiny of China, potentially straining diplomatic or trade ties, while supporting broader efforts against transnational crime.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- Federal Agencies: DHS (primary implementer), intelligence community (e.g., FBI, Director of National Intelligence), and the science and technology undersecretary for R&D.
- Congressional Committees: House and Senate panels on homeland security, finance, judiciary, ways and means, banking, and foreign affairs for oversight and reporting.
- State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments: Through fusion centers and information sharing to address border, port, and drug threats.
- Private Sector and Public: Businesses facing economic threats (e.g., intellectual property theft) and citizens vulnerable to cybersecurity, immigration exploitation, or fentanyl trafficking.
- Chinese Communist Party and Related Entities: Directly targeted for threat assessment, though not legally actionable under this bill.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal and Constitutional: Emphasizes adherence to privacy laws (e.g., protecting personal data), civil rights, and the First Amendment (free speech), reducing risks of overreach in surveillance or immigration enforcement. It aligns with existing national security laws but requires explicit compliance to avoid challenges under the Constitution.
- Political: Bipartisan sponsorship (e.g., Senators from both parties) signals cross-aisle concern over China-related threats. The five-year reporting and seven-year sunset provide temporary focus without permanent bureaucracy, but public unclassified reports could influence policy debates on U.S.-China relations. No direct funding is authorized, so implementation depends on DHS budgets.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (3)
Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA], Sen. Lankford, James [R-OK], Sen. Gallego, Ruben [D-AZ]
Recent Actions
- 2025-05-06: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
- 2025-05-06: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend Against the CCP Act — issued 2025-05-06 — PDF (11 pages)