SHIELD Against CCP Act

Bill Number

H.R. 708

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Immigration

Status

Passed House

Latest Action

2025-03-11: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

Last Updated

2026-07-11T12:28:25Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

This bill, titled the "Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend Against the CCP Act" or "SHIELD Against CCP Act," aims to create a specialized working group within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify and address security threats to the United States from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These threats include terrorism, cybersecurity risks, border and port security issues, and transportation security vulnerabilities. The goal is to improve coordination, resource allocation, and information sharing to counter these risks while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

Key Provisions

• Establishment of the Working Group: Within 180 days of enactment, the DHS Secretary must create the Working Group, led by a Director who reports directly to the Secretary. The group will receive adequate staff, including at least one privacy compliance expert, and can draw on temporary experts (detailees) from intelligence agencies or other federal bodies.

• Core Duties:
• Review and report on DHS efforts to counter CCP-related threats, such as exploitation of immigration systems (e.g., identity theft, visa fraud, smuggling), economic practices (e.g., counterfeit goods, forced labor, intellectual property theft), support for drug trafficking (e.g., fentanyl via borders or mail), and money laundering by Chinese organizations.
• Track DHS resources dedicated to these efforts and evaluate their effectiveness.
• Avoid duplication by incorporating findings from existing DHS groups or committees.
• Identify weaknesses in DHS policies, processes, and operations.
• Promote collaboration across DHS offices for a unified response.

• Information Sharing: The Working Group, working with DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, must review and share threat-related data with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial partners, and the National Network of Fusion Centers (decentralized hubs for sharing homeland security intelligence).

• Annual Assessments: For five years starting 180 days after enactment, DHS must submit reports to Congress assessing CCP threats from the prior year. These include Working Group activities and are provided in unclassified form (with optional classified addendums) on a public DHS website. Briefings to Congress follow within 30 days.

• Oversight and Support:
• The Government Accountability Office (Comptroller General) must review implementation within one year and report to Congress.
• Within one year, DHS must conduct research and development (including testing) on technologies to boost security against these threats, in coordination with DHS's science and technology office.

• Safeguards and Duration: All activities must comply with constitutional protections, privacy laws, civil rights, and civil liberties, without restricting free speech for U.S. persons (individuals or entities under U.S. jurisdiction). The Working Group sunsets (ends) seven years after establishment.

• Definitions: Key terms include "appropriate congressional committees" (specific House and Senate panels on security, finance, judiciary, and foreign affairs), "fusion center," "intelligence community," "National Network of Fusion Centers," and "United States persons."

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This legislation introduces new requirements without directly amending prior laws. It adds a dedicated CCP-focused entity within DHS, mandates annual threat assessments and public reporting (previously absent), and requires R&D on counter-threat technologies. It builds on existing frameworks like the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by enhancing coordination but avoids overlap through reviews of ongoing evaluations.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: Strengthens DHS's internal coordination and resource tracking, involving interagency collaboration with the FBI, Director of National Intelligence, and others. This could improve threat detection but may increase administrative workload and costs for staffing and reporting.

• On Citizens: Enhances protections against specific threats like drug trafficking, cyber risks, and economic exploitation, potentially benefiting public safety and economy. Privacy-focused staffing and legal safeguards aim to minimize risks to individual rights during investigations.

• On International Relations: By targeting CCP activities, it could heighten U.S. scrutiny of China-related security issues, possibly straining bilateral ties or prompting diplomatic responses, while fostering alliances with partners sharing intelligence.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• DHS and Federal Agencies: Primary implementers, including DHS components (e.g., Intelligence and Analysis, Science and Technology offices), FBI, intelligence community, and fusion centers.
• Congressional Committees: House and Senate panels overseeing homeland security, finance, trade, judiciary, and foreign affairs, which receive reports and briefings.
• State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments: Benefit from improved information sharing on threats like border security and drug trafficking.
• Private Sector and Citizens: Indirectly affected through countering economic threats (e.g., businesses facing IP theft or counterfeit goods) and enhanced security measures, with protections for U.S. persons' rights.
• International Partners: Fusion centers and foreign entities may engage in data sharing, impacting global counter-threat efforts.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal and Constitutional: Explicit mandates for privacy, civil rights, civil liberties compliance, and free speech protections address potential overreach concerns in surveillance or immigration enforcement. Terms like "United States persons" align with existing national security laws to limit impacts on Americans.

• Political: The bill's focus on the CCP reflects heightened U.S. concerns over foreign influence and security, potentially influencing broader policy debates on China. Its sunset clause provides a temporary mechanism, allowing future Congresses to reassess without permanent structures. No funding is specified, which may require separate appropriations and spark budgetary discussions.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Cosponsors (8)

Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3], Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3], Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7], Rep. Guest, Michael [R-MS-3], Rep. Luttrell, Morgan [R-TX-8], Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8], Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2], Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Recent Actions

• 2025-03-11: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
• 2025-03-10: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
• 2025-03-10: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H1049-1050)
• 2025-03-10: Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H1049-1050)
• 2025-03-10: DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 708.
• 2025-03-10: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H1049-1051)
• 2025-03-10: Mr. Green (TN) moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill.
• 2025-01-23: Referred to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
• 2025-01-23: Referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-23: Referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-23: Referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-23: Referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-23: Introduced in House
• 2025-01-23: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend Against the CCP Act — issued 2025-03-10 — PDF (12 pages)
• Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend Against the CCP Act — issued 2025-01-23 — PDF (11 pages)
• Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend Against the CCP Act — issued 2025-03-11 — PDF (11 pages)

Related Bills

• S. 1625 (119th Congress)