Monsanto v. Durnell

Docket Number: 24-1068
Citation: 609/1
Term: October Term 2025
Argued: April 27, 2026
Decided: June 25, 2026
Lower Court: Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District
Author: Associate Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
Concurring: Brett M. Kavanaugh, John G. Roberts, Jr., Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting: Ketanji Brown Jackson, Neil M. Gorsuch

Read the official slip opinion (PDF)

AI-Generated Summary

Case Information:

Case Name: Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
Docket Number: 24–1068
Dates: Argued April 27, 2026; decided June 25, 2026
Lower Court: Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District

Facts of the Case:

Monsanto manufactures and distributes Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide. The EPA has repeatedly determined that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans and has not required cancer warnings on Roundup labels. Federal law requires manufacturers to use only EPA-approved labels.
In 2019, John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, alleging that his 20-year use of Roundup caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He prevailed on a failure-to-warn claim, with the jury awarding more than $1 million. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Monsanto’s argument that FIFRA’s preemption provision (7 U.S.C. §136v(b)) barred the claim.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among federal and state courts on whether FIFRA preempts Roundup failure-to-warn claims.

Legal Issues Presented:

Whether FIFRA’s express preemption clause (7 U.S.C. §136v(b)) bars a state-law failure-to-warn claim that would require a cancer warning on Roundup’s label.
The case involves interpretation of a federal statute (FIFRA) and its interaction with state tort duties, which the parties agree constitute labeling requirements under Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).

The Court's Decision (Main Opinion):

Author & Type: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett.
Holding: FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim because it would impose a labeling requirement “in addition to or different from” the requirements imposed under FIFRA.
Legal Reasoning: FIFRA requires EPA approval of pesticide labels, which must contain all warnings “necessary and adequate to protect health and the environment” and no false or misleading statements (§§136a(c)(5)(B), 136(q)(1)(A), (G)). Manufacturers must use the EPA-approved label unless and until the EPA approves or requires a change (40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c)). EPA registration and label approval embody the agency’s determination that the label complies with FIFRA and create federal “requirements” under the preemption clause. State tort duties, including failure-to-warn claims, are labeling requirements. Durnell’s claim would mandate a cancer warning absent from the EPA-approved label. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), confirms this result because the MDA’s nearly identical preemption clause treats FDA premarket approval as imposing preemptive requirements. The Court rejected arguments that the EPA’s registration process exceeds statutory authority, that §136a(f)(2) precludes preemption, or that new safety information creates a regulatory gap (noting FIFRA’s extensive monitoring and amendment procedures).
Disposition: Reversed and remanded.

Concurring Opinion(s):

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. He agreed with the statutory interpretation and preemption analysis but noted potential constitutional concerns with FIFRA’s scope under the Commerce Clause, delegation of legislative power to the EPA, and the preemptive effect of agency action.

Dissenting Opinion(s):

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. The dissent argued that FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition (§136j(a)(1)(E)) is the operative federal requirement and that Durnell’s claim parallels it exactly. Section 136a(f)(2) establishes that EPA registration is only prima facie evidence of compliance and is not a defense to misbranding, so registration does not create a preemptive labeling requirement. The dissent contended that the majority’s theory conflicts with Bates and that the claim is not impliedly preempted because Monsanto could comply with both federal and state law by ceasing sales of Roundup.

Potential Significance:

The ruling establishes that EPA registration and label approval under FIFRA impose federal labeling requirements that preempt state tort claims seeking additional or different warnings on pesticide labels, thereby promoting nationwide uniformity in pesticide labeling.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Pesticide Labels, Cancer Warning, State Lawsuits