Blanche v. Lau

Docket Number: 25-429
Citation: 609/1
Term: October Term 2025
Argued: April 22, 2026
Decided: June 23, 2026
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
Concurring: Clarence Thomas, John G. Roberts, Jr., Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting: Ketanji Brown Jackson, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan

AI-Generated Summary

Case Information:

Case Name: Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Lau (petitioner Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General; respondent Muk Choi Lau)
Docket Number: 25–429
Dates: Argued April 22, 2026; decided June 23, 2026
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (certiorari granted due to conflict with Fifth and Ninth Circuits)

Facts of the Case:

Respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, was admitted as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 2007. In May 2012, he was charged in New Jersey with trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he traveled to China and attempted reentry at JFK Airport on June 15, 2012. Due to the pending charge, the border officer treated him as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) rather than as already admitted, and paroled him pending resolution of the criminal case.
Lau pleaded guilty on June 24, 2013. The Government then initiated removal proceedings, charging him as inadmissible for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude under §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Immigration Judge found him removable, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, holding the Government had proven by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing that Lau fell within the exception and was inadmissible.
The Second Circuit vacated the removal order, holding that the border officer needed clear and convincing evidence at reentry that Lau had committed the crime; lacking that, Lau should have been deemed already admitted. The case was remanded without prejudice to charging deportability.

Legal Issues Presented:

The core question is whether the INA requires a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that an LPR has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the LPR an applicant for admission under §1101(a)(13)(C)(v).
The case involves statutory interpretation of the INA (primarily §§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) and 1182(a)(2)), not constitutional issues.
The Government argued no such evidentiary burden exists at the border. Lau argued the clear-and-convincing standard applicable at removal hearings must also apply at the border, and alternatively that a conviction (not mere commission) is required.

The Court's Decision (Main Opinion):

Author & Type: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court (Majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett).
Holding: The INA does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that an LPR has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission.
Legal Reasoning: Removal on inadmissibility grounds involves two steps: (1) commission of the identified crime suffices to treat the LPR as seeking admission; (2) conviction is required to establish inadmissibility. Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) incorporates only the crimes listed in §1182(a)(2), not its conviction requirement. The INA imposes no clear-and-convincing burden on border officers for the initial determination; any such burden (from BIA precedent) applies only at the removal hearing, which was satisfied here by Lau’s guilty plea. Border officers make “quick judgments on the spot,” and no statute or precedent imposes the Second Circuit’s requirement.
Disposition: Judgment of the Second Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings (including whether Lau’s crime involved moral turpitude).

Concurring Opinion(s) (if any):

Dissenting Opinion(s) (if any):

Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
The dissent argued that §1101(a)(13)(C)’s “shall not” language and use of the present-perfect tense impose a threshold obligation on the Government to determine at the border whether an exception applies before demoting an LPR from already-admitted status. Evidence accrued after parole cannot retroactively justify the border decision; the majority’s approach undermines the statutory scheme protecting LPRs.

Potential Significance:

The ruling clarifies that the Government may rely on post-entry evidence (such as a later conviction) to justify treating an LPR as seeking admission, resolving a circuit split and emphasizing that border determinations need not meet the clear-and-convincing standard. It leaves open the moral-turpitude question for remand while confirming a two-step analytical framework for LPR removal proceedings.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Permanent Residents, Border Reentry, Criminal Charges