Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Docket Number: 24-983
Citation: 608/1
Term: October Term 2025
Argued: February 23, 2026
Decided: May 21, 2026
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
Concurring: Clarence Thomas, John G. Roberts, Jr., Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, Ketanji Brown Jackson
Dissenting: Elena Kagan

AI-Generated Summary

1. Case Information:

2. Facts of the Case:

In 1928, Havana Docks Corporation acquired a time-limited usufructuary concession from the Cuban Government to develop and operate docks at the Port of Havana, set to expire in 2004. The Cuban Government agreed to compensate Havana Docks if it expropriated the docks before expiration.
After the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the Cuban Government seized the docks and Havana Docks’ assets without compensation in 1960, destroying the concession. Havana Docks obtained a certified claim from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission for approximately $9 million in losses plus interest but received no compensation.
Between 2016 and 2019, four cruise lines (Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises) used the docks to transport nearly a million passengers, paying entities affiliated with the Cuban Government. Havana Docks sued the cruise lines in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (22 U.S.C. §6021 et seq.), alleging trafficking in confiscated property.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Havana Docks, awarding more than $100 million against each cruise line. A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that the cruise lines were not liable.

3. Legal Issues Presented:

The primary legal question is whether Title III imposes liability on defendants who use physical property (the docks) that was confiscated by the Cuban Government, or whether liability requires showing that defendants trafficked in the plaintiff’s specific time-limited property interest (the concession) in a manner that would have interfered with that interest absent the confiscation.
The case involves statutory interpretation of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, particularly the definitions of “property,” “confiscated,” and “traffics” in 22 U.S.C. §§6023 and 6082.
Havana Docks argued that the Act creates liability for trafficking in confiscated physical property to which it owns a certified claim. The cruise lines argued that liability requires a counterfactual analysis assuming no confiscation occurred, under which their post-2004 use of the docks would not have interfered with the expired concession.

4. The Court's Decision (Main Opinion):

Author & Type: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson (Majority opinion).
Holding: The cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government”; Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in its specific property interest.
Legal Reasoning: The plain text of Title III makes entities liable for trafficking in “any property . . . and any . . . interest therein” confiscated by the Cuban Government (§§6023(12)(A), 6082(a)(1)(A)). “Property” includes both physical things and interests; “confiscation” includes seizure of control. Confiscated property is “tainted,” and using the physical docks (in which Havana Docks held an interest at the time of seizure) constitutes trafficking without need for a counterfactual analysis of the concession’s expiration. The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s approach as inconsistent with the statute’s antitrafficking purpose and as potentially reading out core applications of the Act.
Disposition: The judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

5. Concurring Opinion(s) (if any):

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kavanaugh. The concurrence agreed with the resolution of the narrow question presented but highlighted unresolved issues for remand, including potential due-process concerns arising from potentially unlimited recoveries under Title III and whether the cruise lines’ conduct fell within the statutory exception for uses incident to lawful travel to Cuba.

6. Dissenting Opinion(s) (if any):

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. The dissent argued that Title III liability attaches only for trafficking in the actual property interest confiscated from the plaintiff (the time-limited concession, which expired in 2004). Because the physical docks always belonged to the Cuban Government and the cruise lines’ use occurred after the concession’s expiration, no liability exists. The dissent criticized the majority for effectively converting temporally limited interests into perpetual ones.

7. Potential Significance:

The ruling clarifies that Title III creates liability for use of confiscated physical property itself, not merely the plaintiff’s former interest in that property, and rejects any requirement of counterfactual analysis assuming no confiscation. It treats confiscated property as tainted and off-limits to subsequent commercial users, potentially broadening the scope of recoverable claims under the Act.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Confiscated Cuban Docks, Cruise Line Liability, Property Trafficking