Hencely v. Fluor Corp.

Docket Number: 24-924
Citation: 608/1
Term: October Term 2025
Argued: November 3, 2025
Decided: April 22, 2026
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
Concurring: Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil M. Gorsuch, Amy Coney Barrett, Ketanji Brown Jackson
Dissenting: Samuel A. Alito, Jr., John G. Roberts, Jr., Brett M. Kavanaugh

AI-Generated Summary

In 2016, at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, Taliban operative Ahmad Nayeb—hired by Fluor Corporation's subcontractor under the military's "Afghan First" initiative to employ locals—detonated a suicide bomb during a Veteran's Day event, killing 5 and wounding 17. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely confronted Nayeb, suffering a fractured skull and permanent brain injuries that prevented greater casualties.
The Army investigation attributed primary responsibility to Fluor for negligent supervision of Nayeb, including failure to escort him per base badge policies, inadequate discipline despite infractions, and allowing unauthorized tool access used in the bomb.
Hencely sued Fluor and subsidiaries in U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina under state tort law for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention. District Court granted summary judgment for Fluor based on Fourth Circuit precedent; Fourth Circuit affirmed under "battlefield preemption" for wartime claims against contractors in combatant activities. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Whether state-law tort claims against a military contractor operating on a U.S. base in a war zone are preempted by federal law—even when the contractor's alleged negligence violated military instructions and was neither ordered nor authorized by the military.
Involves implied conflict preemption under the Supremacy Clause; interpretation of precedents like Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (procurement contracts) and the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) combatant-activities exception (28 U.S.C. §2680(j)); no express constitutional or statutory preemption.
Hencely's arguments: No significant conflict with federal interests; contractor can comply with both military contract and state tort duties; FTCA exception protects only the Government, not contractors.
Fluor's/Fourth Circuit's arguments: Wartime "battlefield preemption" bars all state tort suits against contractors integrated into combatant activities under military command, reflecting congressional intent via FTCA exception to immunize related contractor conduct.

Author & Type: Justice Thomas, Majority opinion (joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson).
Holding: State-law tort claims are not preempted; Fourth Circuit erred, as no constitutional or statutory text preempts suits where the Government neither ordered nor authorized the contractor's challenged conduct.
Legal Reasoning:
No express preemption; FTCA §2680(j) applies only to Government suits (United States v. Orleans); Supremacy Clause requires conflict with federal law.
Boyle limited to "significant conflict" with "uniquely federal interests" (e.g., procurement contracts where Government directs challenged act); here, performance contract with Fluor violated military instructions, posing no conflict (analogous to Boyle's air-conditioner hypothetical).
Fourth Circuit's blanket "battlefield preemption" overbroad; protects only military's own decisions, not unauthorized contractor negligence.
Constitutional war powers do not implicitly preempt; contractors lack derivative immunity absent statute (Yearsley limited to authorized acts); historical precedents allow war-related tort suits without conflict.
Disposition: Vacated Fourth Circuit judgment (120 F. 4th 412) and remanded.

Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh): State tort claims preempted by Constitution's exclusive grant of war and foreign affairs powers to federal branches (Arts. I, II); suit intrudes on military's "Afghan First" policy balancing security risks against strategic goals (e.g., employing/vetting ex-Taliban like Nayeb).
Adjudication risks second-guessing military judgments via discovery, depositions, and jury verdicts; enables "empty chair" defense blaming military; potential application of Afghan law exacerbates intrusion; Boyle and FTCA support preemption in combat zones; distinguishes majority's historical cases as non-state-law or domestic.

Rejects broad "battlefield preemption," limiting it to cases of direct military authorization or significant conflict; reinforces Boyle's narrow test for contractor immunity, allowing state tort liability for negligence contrary to federal directives even in overseas war zones; underscores need for congressional action to immunize contractors; may increase accountability for military contractors while preserving federal war powers from unauthorized acts.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Military Contractor Negligence, Wartime Preemption, Afghanistan Base Attack