Riley v. Bondi

Docket Number: 23-1270
Citation: 606/1
Term: October Term 2024
Argued: March 24, 2025
Decided: June 26, 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
Concurring: Samuel A. Alito, Jr., John G. Roberts, Jr., Clarence Thomas, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting: Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Neil M. Gorsuch

AI-Generated Summary

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, entered the U.S. in 1995 on a tourist visa and overstayed. In 2008, he was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm possession, serving nearly 15 years before compassionate release in January 2021 due to health concerns and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Shortly after release, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, DHS issued a Final Administrative Review Order (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica.
Riley did not contest his removal from the U.S. but sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing torture or death by a Jamaican drug kingpin. An immigration officer initially denied his claim, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica. DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order on May 31, 2022, allowing the FARO’s enforcement.
Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit three days after the BIA’s decision, but the court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the FARO was the final order of removal and the 30-day filing deadline under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1) was jurisdictional, rendering his petition untimely.

Whether a BIA order denying deferral of removal in a “withholding-only” proceeding constitutes a “final order of removal” under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1), triggering the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review.
Whether the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule.

Legal Basis: The case involves interpretation of statutory provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically definitions of “order of removal” and “finality” under 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(47) and 1252, as well as judicial precedents on jurisdictional rules.
Main Arguments:
Riley and the Government: Argued that the BIA order denying CAT relief should be considered the final order for filing purposes, or at least that the removal order’s finality is delayed until withholding-only proceedings conclude, and that the 30-day deadline is a claims-processing rule, not jurisdictional.
Court-Appointed Amicus (defending the judgment below): Argued that the FARO is the final order of removal, the BIA order in withholding-only proceedings is not, and the 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, requiring dismissal of Riley’s untimely petition.

Author & Type: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, representing a majority opinion joined fully by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and joined as to Part II–B by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.
Holding:

A BIA order denying deferral of removal in a withholding-only proceeding is not a “final order of removal” under §1252(b)(1); the FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is the final order of removal.
The 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Legal Reasoning:
Final Order of Removal: The Court relied on statutory text defining an “order of removal” as one “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation” under §1101(a)(47)(A). The FARO met this definition, becoming final immediately upon issuance since streamlined removal proceedings do not allow BIA review. Precedents like Nasrallah v. Barr (590 U.S. 573) and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez (594 U.S. 523) support that CAT orders do not affect the finality or validity of removal orders and do not merge with them for judicial review purposes.
Filing Deadline as Non-Jurisdictional: The Court emphasized reluctance to label rules as jurisdictional absent clear congressional intent. The text of §1252(b)(1) lacks jurisdictional language or directives to courts, and its placement does not suggest jurisdictional status. Post-Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (546 U.S. 500) precedents consistently treat filing deadlines as non-jurisdictional unless explicitly stated otherwise by Congress, distinguishing prior loose uses of “jurisdictional” in cases like Stone v. INS (514 U.S. 386).
Disposition: The Fourth Circuit’s judgment dismissing Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings, noting that the Government did not seek dismissal based on the non-jurisdictional deadline.

Justice Thomas: Joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to highlight a potential jurisdictional issue on remand. He noted that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders independently under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) unless part of a final order of removal review under §1252. Since Riley did not seek review of the FARO, Thomas urged the Fourth Circuit to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review the CAT order in isolation.

Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson in full, and by Justice Gorsuch except as to Part IV): Dissented in part, agreeing that the 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional but disagreeing with the holding that the FARO is the final order of removal for filing purposes. She argued that requiring Riley to appeal before the BIA’s CAT order was issued is illogical and contrary to statutory intent and finality principles. Sotomayor contended that Congress intended consolidated review of removal and CAT orders via the “zipper clause” (§1252(b)(9)) and §1252(a)(4), meaning the removal order should not be final until withholding-only proceedings conclude. She criticized the majority for ignoring precedents against protective appeals and creating an incoherent scheme, potentially undermining judicial review and due process for noncitizens.

The ruling clarifies that in expedited removal proceedings, the initial FARO is the final order of removal for the purposes of the 30-day filing deadline, potentially requiring aliens to file protective appeals early to preserve review rights for later CAT decisions. This may lead to increased administrative and judicial burdens due to premature filings.
By holding the 30-day filing deadline as a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule, the decision allows flexibility for equitable considerations or government waivers, potentially preventing dismissal of late petitions if not enforced.
The decision resolves circuit splits on both the finality of removal orders in withholding-only contexts and the nature of the filing deadline, providing uniform guidance, though it may prompt further litigation on jurisdictional limits of reviewing standalone CAT orders as highlighted by Justice Thomas.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Immigration Removal, Convention Against Torture, Filing Deadline