NRC v. Texas

Docket Number: 23-1300
Citation: 605/2
Term: October Term 2024
Argued: March 5, 2025
Decided: June 18, 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
Concurring: John G. Roberts, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett, Ketanji Brown Jackson
Dissenting: Neil M. Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

AI-Generated Summary

Case Name: Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Texas et al. (together with Interim Storage Partners, LLC v. Texas et al.)
Docket Number: 23-1300 and 23-1312
Dates: Argued March 5, 2025; Decided June 18, 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Narrative of Events: Interim Storage Partners (ISP), a private entity, applied for a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2018 to build and operate a facility in Andrews County, West Texas, for the storage of spent nuclear fuel. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally prohibits private possession of nuclear materials without a license, and the NRC has the authority to issue such licenses. During the licensing process, a Texas government agency and Fasken Land and Minerals, a private West Texas business, submitted comments on the draft environmental impact statement (EIS). Fasken also sought to intervene in the proceeding but was denied by the NRC. In September 2021, the NRC granted ISP a 40-year renewable license to build and operate the storage facility.
Procedural History: Fasken challenged the denial of intervention before the full NRC and the D.C. Circuit, both of which upheld the denial. Texas and Fasken then sought judicial review of the NRC’s licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit, which vacated ISP’s license, ruling that the NRC lacked statutory authority for such licensing and that Texas and Fasken could challenge the decision as ultra vires action. The NRC and ISP appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Legal Questions: The primary issue was whether Texas and Fasken, who were not admitted as parties in the NRC’s licensing proceeding, are entitled to judicial review of the NRC’s decision to grant ISP a license under the Hobbs Act. Secondary issues included whether their participation through comments or attempted intervention qualified them as parties, and whether they could challenge the decision as ultra vires agency action outside statutory review mechanisms.
Legal Basis: The case involves interpretation of the Hobbs Act (28 U.S.C. §2344), which limits judicial review to a “party aggrieved,” and the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. §2239), which defines party status in NRC licensing proceedings. It also touches on precedents regarding ultra vires review (e.g., Leedom v. Kyne).
Main Arguments: Texas and Fasken argued they qualified as parties by submitting comments and, in Fasken’s case, attempting to intervene, and alternatively, that they could challenge ultra vires action regardless of party status. The NRC and ISP contended that only license applicants or successful intervenors are parties under the Atomic Energy Act, and thus Texas and Fasken lacked standing for judicial review.

Author & Type: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, representing a Majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson.
Holding: Texas and Fasken are not entitled to judicial review of the NRC’s licensing decision because they were not parties to the licensing proceeding, as required by the Hobbs Act. Party status under the Atomic Energy Act is limited to license applicants or those successfully admitted as intervenors, which neither Texas nor Fasken achieved.
Legal Reasoning: The Court interpreted the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act to restrict judicial review to “parties” who are either license applicants or have been granted intervention by the NRC. Submitting comments or attempting to intervene does not confer party status. The Court rejected Fasken’s collateral attack on the D.C. Circuit’s prior ruling upholding the denial of intervention, emphasizing the finality of that decision. On the ultra vires claim, the Court found it did not meet the narrow Leedom v. Kyne exception, as it was a typical statutory authority dispute, and alternative judicial review paths (e.g., challenging intervention denial) were available. The Court did not reach the merits of whether the NRC has authority to license private off-site storage facilities.
Disposition: The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed, and the cases were remanded with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review.

Author & Justices: Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.
Reasons for Dissent: Justice Gorsuch argued that Texas and Fasken are “parties aggrieved” under the Hobbs Act due to their active participation in the NRC’s environmental review process by submitting comments, which he deemed sufficient for party status in less formal agency proceedings. He criticized the majority for requiring successful intervention under §2239 as the sole path to party status, asserting that this interpretation restricts access to judicial review and allows the NRC to control who can challenge its decisions. On the merits, which he believed the Court should address, Gorsuch contended that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) explicitly limits interim storage of spent nuclear fuel to reactor sites or federal facilities, rendering the NRC’s license to ISP unlawful. He rejected the majority’s historical and precedential support for the NRC’s authority as unpersuasive and dicta.

The ruling clarifies the strict requirements for obtaining judicial review of NRC licensing decisions under the Hobbs Act, emphasizing that only those admitted as parties through intervention or as applicants can seek such review. This may limit challenges to NRC actions by entities unable to secure intervention, potentially affecting public and state participation in nuclear regulatory processes. The decision reinforces the finality of intervention denials and narrows the scope of ultra vires claims, preserving statutory review mechanisms over nonstatutory challenges. While the Court did not decide the underlying issue of NRC authority to license private off-site storage, the majority’s discussion suggests historical and judicial support for such authority, which could influence future litigation or regulatory interpretations if the merits are later addressed.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Nuclear Waste Storage, Licensing Authority, Judicial Review