Delligatti v. United States

Docket Number: 23-825
Citation: 604/2
Term: October Term 2024
Argued: November 12, 2024
Decided: March 21, 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Author: Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
Concurring: Clarence Thomas, John G. Roberts, Jr., Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting: Neil M. Gorsuch, Ketanji Brown Jackson

Read the official slip opinion (PDF)

AI-Generated Summary

Case Summary: Delligatti v. United States

1. Case Information:

Case Name: Salvatore Delligatti v. United States
Docket Number: 23–825
Dates: Argued November 12, 2024; Decided March 21, 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

2. Facts of the Case:

Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese crime family, was hired by a local gas station owner in 2014 to kill Joseph Bonelli, a suspected police informant. Delligatti recruited gang members, provided them with a car and a loaded revolver, and instructed them to carry out the murder. The gang members attempted to execute the plan but abandoned it due to potential witnesses and were later arrested by police before completing the act.
Delligatti was charged with multiple offenses, including using or carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. §924(c), with the predicate offense being attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(5), based on New York second-degree murder. Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss the §924(c) charge, arguing that the predicate offense was not a crime of violence. The District Court denied the motion, and a jury convicted him on all counts, sentencing him to 25 years. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that New York attempted second-degree murder qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether causing injury or death by omission constitutes the “use of physical force” under §924(c)(3)(A).

3. Legal Issues Presented:

Question: Does the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death by omission constitute the “use of physical force against the person or property of another” under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(A)?
Legal Basis: The case involves the interpretation of a federal statute, specifically §924(c)(3)(A), which defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.
Arguments: Delligatti argued that New York second-degree murder, which can be committed by omission (failure to perform a legal duty), does not involve the “use of physical force” as required by §924(c)(3)(A). The United States contended that the intentional causation of harm, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force under the statute, relying on prior Supreme Court precedent.

4. The Court's Decision (Main Opinion):

Author & Type: Justice Thomas, Majority Opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett)
Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use of physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, New York second-degree murder, and by extension VICAR attempted murder predicated on it, qualifies as a crime of violence.
Legal Reasoning:
The Court extended the logic of United States v. Castleman (572 U.S. 157), which held that intentional causation of bodily injury involves the use of physical force under a related statute, to §924(c). The Court found that even if §924(c) requires a higher degree of “violent force” compared to battery-level force, the intentional causation of harm still qualifies.
The Court rejected the distinction between acts and omissions, holding that deliberate inaction (e.g., a parent withholding food leading to a child’s death) constitutes a “use” of physical force, as it employs external forces to cause harm. This interpretation aligns with ordinary language and common-law principles where murder includes liability for omissions.
The Court emphasized that the statutory phrase “against the person or property of another” does not exclude omissions, as the harm is directed at a specific person as the “conscious object” of the force.
The ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” supports including intentional murder, a prototypical violent crime, whether committed by act or omission, as historically recognized in many states and treatises at the time of §924(c)’s enactment in 1986.
Disposition: The judgment of the Second Circuit is affirmed.

5. Concurring Opinion(s):

There are no concurring opinions mentioned in the provided text.

6. Dissenting Opinion(s):

Author & Justices: Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Jackson
Reasons for Dissent:
Justice Gorsuch argued that the statutory text of §924(c)(3)(A) does not cover crimes of omission, as the term “use” implies active employment of force, not inaction or inertia, citing precedents like Bailey v. United States (516 U.S. 137).
He contended that “physical force” requires a violent, physical act, not merely allowing natural forces to cause harm, and that the statute’s context (e.g., legislative history and linguistic usage) supports excluding omissions.
Gorsuch criticized the majority for relying on precedent like Castleman and Stokeling, which do not address omissions, and for prioritizing perceived legislative purpose over statutory text.
He noted that even if ambiguity exists, the rule of lenity should favor a narrower interpretation excluding omissions from the definition of a crime of violence.

7. Potential Significance:

The ruling establishes that crimes involving intentional causation of harm by omission are considered “crimes of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A), potentially broadening the scope of predicate offenses for mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements related to firearm use.
It reinforces the categorical approach in assessing whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence, focusing on the elements of the offense rather than specific conduct, which may impact how lower courts evaluate state law predicates under federal statutes.
The decision clarifies the interpretation of “use of physical force” to include indirect or omission-based causation, potentially influencing future cases involving similar statutory definitions in federal criminal law.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Key terms: Crime Of Violence, Use Of Physical Force, Omission In Law