Regarding the Acquisition of Certain Assets of Emcore Corporation by Hiefo Corporation

President

Donald J. Trump

Signed

January 2, 2026

Source

White House

Original Document

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/regarding-the-acquisition-of-certain-assets-of-emcore-corporation-by-hiefo-corporation/

AI-Generated Summary

Summary of Executive Order (January 2, 2026)

Purpose

To prohibit the completed acquisition of Emcore Corporation's digital chips and related wafer design, fabrication, and processing assets (Emcore Assets) by HieFo Corporation—a Delaware company controlled by a Chinese citizen—due to credible evidence that it threatens U.S. national security. The order invokes authority under section 721 of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. 4565) via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

Key Actions or Directives

• Prohibit the Transaction: Nullifies the April 30, 2024, acquisition; bans HieFo and its affiliates from owning any interest in the Emcore Assets.
• Mandate Divestiture: HieFo must divest all Emcore Assets (including contracts, inventory, IP, real property, etc.) within 180 days, subject to CFIUS extensions.
• Restrict Access and Operations:
• No access to Emcore Assets, non-public technical data, or facilities by non-HieFo personnel until divestiture is verified.
• Prohibits dissolution, reorganization, or transfers that impede compliance.
• Weekly compliance certifications to CFIUS; potential audits at HieFo's expense.
• Post-Divestiture Requirements: Written certifications of completion, including destruction/transfer of IP; CFIUS verifies within 90 days.
• Buyer Vetting: Proposed buyers must be notified to CFIUS 30 days in advance; CFIUS can object based on nationality, ties to HieFo, compliance ability, or national security risks.
• Enforcement: CFIUS authorized for inspections, interviews, conditions; Attorney General to enforce; anti-circumvention clause; tolling during lapses in appropriations.
• Reservation: President reserves authority for further orders.

Significant Changes to Policy or Law

• No broad changes to existing law; applies existing CFIUS authority post-transaction to unwind a completed deal, emphasizing ex-post intervention when other laws are deemed inadequate.
• Clarifies U.S. nationals on HieFo's board (as of November 26, 2025) are not affiliates for compliance purposes.
• Includes severability clause and procedural safeguards if provisions are invalidated.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases CFIUS workload for verification, audits, and enforcement; empowers inter-agency coordination.
• Businesses: Forces rapid divestiture, disrupting HieFo's operations and Emcore Assets' supply chain; may deter future foreign investments in U.S. semiconductor tech.
• Citizens/Industry: Protects domestic control of critical semiconductor technologies, potentially enhancing U.S. supply chain security.
• International Relations: Signals heightened scrutiny of Chinese-linked investments in strategic sectors, possibly straining U.S.-China economic ties.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• HieFo Corporation and Affiliates: Primary targets; bear compliance costs, divestiture burdens, and restrictions.
• Emcore Corporation: Indirectly affected via asset unwind and operational disruptions.
• CFIUS and U.S. Agencies (e.g., Treasury, Attorney General): Lead implementation, verification, and enforcement.
• Potential U.S. Buyers: Benefit from vetted acquisition opportunities but face CFIUS review.
• U.S. Semiconductor Industry: Gains from reduced foreign control risks.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Relies on presidential authority under CFIUS statute for national security reviews; enables post-closing divestitures, with judicial severability and enforcement via Attorney General (section 721(d)(3)).
• Constitutional: Exercises executive power over foreign investment to protect national security, consistent with Article II; no novel constitutional challenges noted.
• Political: Demonstrates aggressive use of CFIUS against Chinese-controlled entities in critical technologies; could precedent future interventions, influencing investor confidence and bipartisan national security consensus on supply chains.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.