Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026

Bill Number

S. 3900

Origin Chamber

Senate

Congress

119th Congress, Session 2

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2026-06-17: Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.

Last Updated

2026-06-18T15:25:25Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026 aims to support the Iranian people's demands for human rights, dignity, and freedom by countering the Iranian regime's repression, violence against protesters, and restrictions on internet access and communication. It promotes U.S. policies to expand unrestricted internet access, enforce sanctions on human rights abusers, and enhance broadcasting and civil society support in Iran, without authorizing military force.

Key Provisions

• Findings and Policy Statement: Congress outlines the Iranian regime's long history of brutality, including killings, arrests, and internet shutdowns during protests (e.g., 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement and 2026 protests). U.S. policy emphasizes recognizing Iranians' right to self-determination via free elections, facilitating open internet and communication, supporting human rights documentation, enforcing sanctions on abusers (including their U.S.-based family and associates), and coordinating with allies to deter violence.

• Coordination of Internet Freedom Efforts: Designates the Secretary of State as the lead official for promoting internet freedom in Iran, coordinating federal efforts, and updating the existing strategy under the 2012 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRA). Updates include evaluating virtual private networks (VPNs—a tool to bypass internet restrictions), direct-to-cell satellite technologies, ensuring sanctions do not hinder civilian internet tools, and strategies to counter full internet blackouts. The first update must be submitted within 120 days of enactment, in unclassified form with a possible classified annex.

• Internet Freedom Report and Funding Extension: Requires an updated report (within 120 days) assessing direct-to-cell wireless tech feasibility, impacts of drones and jamming on communications, and surveys of Iran's telecom providers (e.g., state control and foreign involvement). Extends the Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program funding to at least $20 million annually for fiscal years 2027–2030 (up from $15 million for 2025–2026).

• Working Group for Internet Access Technologies: Establishes a joint group (State Department, Defense Department, U.S. Agency for Global Media, and others) to develop low-cost, scalable tools against internet shutdowns, prioritizing low-earth orbit satellites, mesh networks (decentralized communication systems), portable devices, VPNs, and off-the-shelf solutions. Includes collaboration with the Federal Acquisition Institute for efficient procurement, annual progress reports to Congress, and funding authorization through 2030.

• Sanctions on Human Rights Violators: Directs the President (within 120 days of a congressional request) to assess if foreign persons knowingly support Iran's human rights abuses, censorship, or repression (e.g., via surveillance tools or sanctions under existing laws like the Global Magnitsky Act). Requires justification for imposing or withholding sanctions.

• Broadcasting and Human Rights Strategy: Mandates a strategy (within 120 days) to enhance U.S. and international broadcasting (e.g., Voice of America Persian Service, Radio Farda) and human rights programs, including reviews of current efforts, plans for uncensored news via satellites and digital tools, support for Iranian journalists and civil society, coordination with partners, performance metrics, and a multi-year budget. Requires an unclassified submission with a possible classified annex.

• GAO Report on Funding: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) must report (within 180 days) on Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) account spending in 2024–2025, detailing Iran-related uses (e.g., broadcasting, civil society aid), oversight processes, effectiveness, and improvement recommendations.

• Cybersecurity for Civil Society: Requires programs (within 180 days) for remote/in-person training on cybersecurity for Iranian journalists, human rights defenders, and activists; provision of tools like VPNs and encrypted messaging; and educational materials on regime threats (e.g., phishing—fake emails to steal data). Includes quarterly metrics reporting, a GAO evaluation after 3 years, and funding through 2030. Does not override existing internet freedom authorities.

• Rule of Construction: Explicitly states the Act does not authorize military force.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Amendments to ITRA (2012): Adds new elements to the internet freedom strategy (e.g., VPN/satellite evaluations, blackout countermeasures) and requires ongoing reviews/updates, shifting from a one-time strategy to a dynamic process.
• National Defense Authorization Act (2025) Updates: Supplements the existing internet freedom report with new assessments on wireless tech, drone/jamming risks, and telecom surveys; extends grant program funding and duration.
• New Mechanisms: Introduces a dedicated working group, mandatory presidential responses to sanction requests, a broadcasting/human rights strategy, cybersecurity programs, and GAO oversight of NERD funds—none of which existed before.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases workload for the State Department (lead on coordination, reports, strategies, and programs), Defense Department (tech development), U.S. Agency for Global Media (broadcasting), Treasury/Commerce (sanctions enforcement), and GAO (evaluations). Authorizes new appropriations, potentially requiring budget reallocations or expansions through 2030.
• Citizens: Bolsters support for Iranian protesters, journalists, and civil society by improving internet access, cybersecurity, and information flow, potentially aiding protests and human rights documentation. U.S. citizens (e.g., Iranian diaspora or associates) may face indirect effects via expanded sanctions on regime supporters.
• International Relations: Strengthens U.S. alliances through coordination on deterring violence and sharing tech; may escalate tensions with Iran by targeting regime enablers and highlighting abuses. Could influence global tech standards for censorship circumvention and encourage similar support in other repressive contexts.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Iranian People and Civil Society: Primary beneficiaries, gaining enhanced tools for communication, safety, and rights advocacy.
• Iranian Regime Officials and Supporters: Targeted for sanctions, including those providing censorship tech or material support to abuses.
• U.S. Government Entities: State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, U.S. Agency for Global Media, FCC, and congressional committees (e.g., Foreign Relations/Affairs, Armed Services, Intelligence, Appropriations).
• International Partners and Private Sector: Allies, telecom/satellite providers, NGOs, journalists, and diaspora communities involved in coordination, tech development, and broadcasting.
• Tech and Media Industries: Affected by funding for VPNs, satellites, and tools; must navigate sanctions to support Iranian civilians.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces existing sanction frameworks (e.g., Global Magnitsky Act, ITRA regulations) by mandating quicker presidential assessments, potentially increasing enforcement but requiring careful implementation to avoid blocking civilian tech. All reports/strategies allow classified annexes to protect sensitive info.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's foreign affairs powers (e.g., funding authorizations, oversight of executive actions) without encroaching on presidential foreign policy discretion; the no-military-force clause avoids war powers issues.
• Political: Bipartisan introduction (by Sens. McCormick and Rosen) signals broad U.S. consensus on non-violent democracy promotion. Emphasizes human rights over confrontation, but could politicize U.S.-Iran relations by amplifying regime criticisms and supporting opposition, influencing future diplomacy or negotiations.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

Cosponsors (17)

Sen. Rosen, Jacky [D-NV], Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT], Sen. Gillibrand, Kirsten E. [D-NY], Sen. Banks, Jim [R-IN], Sen. Schiff, Adam B. [D-CA], Sen. Collins, Susan M. [R-ME], Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN], Sen. Capito, Shelley Moore [R-WV], Sen. Booker, Cory A. [D-NJ], Sen. Sullivan, Dan [R-AK], Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA], Sen. Justice, James C. [R-WV], Sen. Warnock, Raphael G. [D-GA], Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX], Sen. Blumenthal, Richard [D-CT], Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD], Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA]

Recent Actions

• 2026-06-17: Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
• 2026-02-24: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
• 2026-02-24: Introduced in Senate

Bill Versions

• Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026 — issued 2026-02-24 — PDF (20 pages)