Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
- Bill Number
- S. 3249
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2026-02-10: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 327.
- Last Updated
- 2026-06-04T11:03:25Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose of the Legislation
The Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 aims to strengthen U.S. government efforts to protect, install, maintain, and repair international subsea fiber-optic cables and related critical undersea infrastructure. It addresses growing threats from sabotage, particularly by adversaries like China and Russia, by improving coordination among U.S. agencies, enhancing international partnerships, and authorizing sanctions against those responsible for damaging this infrastructure. The bill treats these cables and pipelines as essential to global data transmission (95% of internet traffic), energy transport, and economic security, viewing them as vital "strategic links" for the U.S. and its allies.
Key Provisions
The legislation is structured into three titles, focusing on international engagement, Department of State expertise, and domestic coordination for subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
Title I: International Coordination and Engagement on Critical Undersea Infrastructure
- Findings (Sec. 101): Documents recent sabotage incidents (e.g., Nord Stream pipelines in 2022, Baltic Sea cables in 2023–2026) and international responses, such as NATO's Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network and the Quad's (U.S., India, Japan, Australia) partnership on cable resilience.
- Sense of Congress (Sec. 102): Emphasizes that critical undersea infrastructure (carrying $10 trillion in daily transfers) is a "vital strategic and economic link" and urges greater U.S. leadership in bodies like NATO, the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), and regional alliances to promote resilience and information sharing.
- Enhanced Engagement (Sec. 103): Directs the Secretary of State to boost U.S. involvement in the ICPC and other international bodies; requires annual reports for 5 years on how this advances U.S. security, counters Chinese influence, and encourages global participation.
- Sanctions for Sabotage (Sec. 104): Authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons (individuals, entities, or vessels) responsible for or facilitating sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure. Sanctions include blocking U.S. assets and revoking visas; includes a national security waiver and exceptions for UN obligations or U.S. intelligence activities. Requires reports justifying sanctions within 15 days.
- Report on China and Russia Activities (Sec. 105): Mandates annual reports for 5 years (starting 180 days after enactment) on these countries' capabilities in cable manufacturing, deep-sea sabotage vessels, and anomalous vessel behavior near infrastructure. Covers Russian entities like GUGI and GRU, Chinese groups like the People's Liberation Army, and potential U.S.-China-Russia cooperation; initial report covers 2022 onward.
- Report on Potential Sabotage (Sec. 106): Requires a one-time intelligence community assessment (180 days after enactment) attributing causes to specific incidents (e.g., Nord Stream, Taiwan Strait cables), including feasibility analyses and law enforcement outcomes.
- Engaging Foreign Partners (Sec. 107): Urges diplomatic efforts to reduce barriers (e.g., foreign laws hindering repairs) and build a multinational repair fleet; requires annual reports for 5 years on progress with allies.
Title II: Department of State Critical Undersea Infrastructure Expertise
- Expanding Expertise (Sec. 201): Requires hiring at least 10 full-time staff at the State Department (at least 5 in the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy) dedicated to undersea infrastructure issues like protection, ally coordination, and international engagement. Prohibits using existing staff to meet this quota; requires notification to Congress within 15 days of hiring and a 90-day report on boosting information sharing on sabotage.
Title III: Subsea Telecommunications Infrastructure Coordination, Construction, and Repair
- Improving Government Coordination (Sec. 301): Establishes an interagency committee (led by agency heads from State, Defense, Homeland Security, etc.) within 1 year to oversee protection, resilience, permitting, and emergency responses for subsea telecom infrastructure. Requires an overview of U.S. operations, including concepts for public-private partnerships in crises and streamlined permitting. Directs strategies for analyzing sabotage trends, attributions, and risk mitigation, with ally coordination. Mandates a 30-day report post-establishment on staffing and plans.
- Strengthening Information Sharing (Sec. 302): Requires procedures (within 60 days) for sharing classified/unclassified threat data between government and private entities (e.g., cable owners) to prevent sabotage, while protecting privacy and intelligence sources. Incorporates existing processes and security controls; annual reports for 5 years on implementation.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
This bill introduces new authorities and structures not previously codified:
- Creates the interagency committee as a dedicated forum for subsea telecom coordination, addressing gaps noted in a 2024 Homeland Security report where no comprehensive U.S. collaboration mechanism existed.
- Expands sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to specifically target undersea sabotage facilitators (e.g., vessel owners, insurers), beyond general foreign adversary sanctions.
- Broadens focus from original subsea fiber-optic cables to "critical undersea infrastructure," including energy pipelines and electricity cables (a key amendment).
- Mandates new reporting on specific threats from China/Russia and incident attributions, filling voids in existing intelligence-sharing laws like the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).
- Enhances State Department staffing and diplomatic mandates, building on but exceeding current cyberspace policy roles.
No direct amendments to prior laws, but it leverages IEEPA and Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) for enforcement.
Potential Impacts
- On Government Agencies: Increases workload and resources for State (10 new positions), intelligence community (new reports), and agencies like Defense/Homeland Security via the interagency committee. Could streamline permitting, reducing delays in cable projects, but requires budgeting for staffing and operations.
- On Citizens: Bolsters protection of global internet (95% via subsea cables) and energy supplies, potentially reducing outage risks from sabotage that could disrupt communications, finance ($10 trillion daily), and daily life. Indirectly supports economic stability by deterring threats.
- On International Relations: Strengthens U.S. alliances (e.g., NATO, Quad, ASEAN) through shared intelligence and repair fleets, while pressuring adversaries like China/Russia via sanctions and exposure of activities. May encourage global standards for cable protection, but could strain relations if sanctions target foreign vessels or entities.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Government Agencies: State Department (diplomacy/expertise), Defense/Homeland Security (security/coordination), Intelligence Community (reports/attributions), Treasury (sanctions), and others like Commerce/FCC (permitting).
- Private Sector: Non-federal entities such as cable owners, operators, manufacturers, repair firms, and insurers, who gain better threat information but face new compliance for sharing data.
- Allies and Partners: NATO members, Quad countries (India, Japan, Australia), EU/ASEAN nations, benefiting from coordinated responses and reduced repair barriers.
- Adversaries: China and Russia (and their entities like GUGI/GRU), facing sanctions, scrutiny, and exposed activities.
- General Public/Consumers: Indirectly affected through secured global data/energy flows.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Relies on executive powers under IEEPA for sanctions, which courts have upheld as constitutional for national security (e.g., blocking property without due process if tied to foreign threats). Visa revocations align with immigration law but include waivers to avoid overreach. Procedures emphasize privacy/civil liberties protections in info-sharing, mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns.
- Constitutional: Enhances executive branch flexibility in foreign affairs and sanctions (Article II powers), with congressional oversight via reports/waivers, balancing separation of powers. No direct First Amendment issues, as focus is on sabotage, not speech.
- Political: Signals U.S. prioritization of hybrid threats (physical/cyber sabotage) amid Russia-Ukraine tensions and China-Taiwan risks, potentially bipartisan support for infrastructure security. Could escalate geopolitical tensions if sanctions are applied, but promotes multilateralism to build ally consensus. The amendment's expansion to energy infrastructure reflects evolving threats, possibly influencing future bills on critical infrastructure (e.g., under CISA).
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (8)
Sen. Barrasso, John [R-WY], Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID], Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE], Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA], Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA], Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV], Sen. Gillibrand, Kirsten E. [D-NY], Sen. Lummis, Cynthia M. [R-WY]
Recent Actions
- 2026-02-10: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 327.
- 2026-02-10: Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.
- 2026-02-10: Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.
- 2026-01-29: Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
- 2025-11-20: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- 2025-11-20: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2025 — issued 2025-11-20 — PDF (24 pages)
- Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 — issued 2026-02-10 — PDF (64 pages)