STOP China and Russia Act of 2025

Bill Number

S. 2657

Origin Chamber

Senate

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-10-30: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 241.

Last Updated

2025-11-01T03:53:13Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The STOP China and Russia Act of 2025 aims to impose sanctions on individuals and entities from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation that support each other's military capabilities, particularly in relation to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and potential military actions in the Taiwan Strait. It seeks to disrupt the transfer of technology, goods, and training between the two countries that bolster their defense industries, while promoting coordinated international efforts to deter such cooperation.

Key Provisions

• Definitions (Section 2): Establishes terms such as "PRC person" (citizens, nationals, or entities based in or controlled by China), "Russian Federation person" (similarly defined for Russia), "foreign person" (non-U.S. persons), and "knowingly" (actual knowledge or should have known). It also defines "United States person" to include citizens, permanent residents, U.S.-based entities, and anyone in the U.S.

• Findings and Sense of Congress (Section 3):
• Congress finds that Chinese entities have evaded U.S. sanctions to supply Russia's defense sector with critical items like machine tools, chemicals, and sensors since 2022. It also notes Russia's agreement to provide China with military equipment and training to enhance operations in the Taiwan Strait by 2027.
• Congress expresses that China's support enables Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia's aid to China threatens U.S. national security. It urges the President to impose sanctions, cut financing, and coordinate with allies.

• Sanctions Imposition (Section 4):
• Starting 90 days after enactment, the President must sanction foreign persons (PRC or Russian individuals/entities) who knowingly provide or facilitate goods/services to Russia's armed forces or defense industry (e.g., machine tools, lubricants, explosives components, fiber optic cables, sensors) or procure arms, weapons, training, or parts from Russia that enhance China's military capabilities for Taiwan Strait operations.
• Sanctions include:
• Blocking all U.S.-related property and transactions (under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, which allows the President to control economic dealings during emergencies).
• Making affected aliens inadmissible to the U.S., ineligible for visas, and revoking existing visas immediately.
• Implementation: The President can issue regulations and use IEEPA penalties (fines up to $1 million or imprisonment up to 20 years for violations). Exceptions apply for U.S. intelligence/law enforcement, international obligations (e.g., UN headquarters access), and no sanctions on importing goods. Waivers are possible for up to 90 days if in U.S. national interests. Sanctions terminate if the person stops activities and provides assurances, or automatically after 7 years.

• Coordination Strategy (Section 5):
• Within 30 days of enactment, the Secretary of State (with Treasury input) must submit a strategy to allies (e.g., EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) for joint diplomatic, sanctions, and export control actions to counter mutual military support between China and Russia.
• The strategy includes diplomatic engagement plans and compliance efforts with financial institutions.
• Quarterly progress reports assess effectiveness; submissions are unclassified with optional classified annexes.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Expands beyond prior U.S. sanctions on Chinese entities aiding Russia (e.g., designations since 2022 under Treasury and State Department authorities) by mandating new sanctions on both directions of support—China to Russia and Russia to China—specifically targeting Taiwan-related enhancements.
• Introduces a 7-year sunset clause for sanctions, unlike some permanent measures in existing laws like IEEPA-based sanctions.
• Shifts from voluntary presidential actions (urged in the original bill) to mandatory determinations and impositions, while removing a requirement to assess specific Chinese arms manufacturers (e.g., China North Industries Group) that was in the introduced version.
• Builds on Executive Order 13959 (restricting U.S. investments in Chinese military-linked companies) by linking civilian firms' support for foreign militaries to broader national security threats.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Departments of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security to identify targets, implement sanctions, issue reports, and coordinate internationally. Could strain resources for visa processing and property blocking.
• On Citizens: U.S. persons (individuals or businesses) face penalties for dealings with sanctioned entities, potentially disrupting trade or financial ties. Affected foreign individuals may lose U.S. travel rights, impacting families or business travel.
• On International Relations: May escalate tensions with China and Russia, prompting retaliatory measures. Strengthens alliances by fostering coordinated sanctions/export controls, but could complicate U.S.-China economic relations (e.g., global supply chains). Aims to support Ukraine and deter Taiwan aggression without direct military involvement.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• PRC and Russian Entities/Individuals: Arms exporters, defense firms, and suppliers (e.g., those dealing in dual-use technologies like sensors or explosives) face asset freezes and travel bans.
• U.S. Government and Financial Institutions: Must enforce sanctions, potentially affecting banks and exporters complying with regulations.
• Allies and Partners: EU members, UK, Japan, etc., involved in strategy implementation, benefiting from shared intelligence but risking their own trade ties with China/Russia.
• Ukraine and Taiwan: Indirect beneficiaries through weakened Russian/Chinese military capabilities.
• Global Businesses: Companies in tech, manufacturing, or finance may face compliance costs or disrupted partnerships.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Relies on IEEPA (a post-1977 law granting broad presidential economic powers during national emergencies) and the Immigration and Nationality Act for visa restrictions, ensuring due process via waivers and terminations. Exceptions protect constitutional rights like free speech in intelligence activities. Penalties align with existing federal sanctions frameworks, avoiding new criminal categories.
• Constitutional: Balances executive foreign policy powers (Article II) with congressional oversight (e.g., required reports and waivers to committees), upholding separation of powers. No direct First Amendment issues, as it targets conduct, not speech.
• Political: Bipartisan (introduced by Sens. Shaheen and Cornyn; reported by Sen. Risch), signals U.S. commitment to countering authoritarian alliances amid Ukraine/Taiwan concerns. Could influence 2026 midterms or future administrations by mandating actions, but waivers provide flexibility. Risks politicizing sanctions if used inconsistently, potentially straining domestic consensus on China/Russia policy.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]

Cosponsors (1)

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Recent Actions

• 2025-10-30: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 241.
• 2025-10-30: Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.
• 2025-10-30: Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.
• 2025-10-22: Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
• 2025-08-01: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
• 2025-08-01: Introduced in Senate

Bill Versions

• Severing Technology Transfer Operations and Partnerships between China and Russia Act of 2025 — issued 2025-08-01 — PDF (15 pages)
• Severing Technology Transfer Operations and Partnerships between China and Russia Act of 2025 — issued 2025-10-30 — PDF (32 pages)