Election Worker Protection Act of 2025

Bill Number

S. 2124

Origin Chamber

Senate

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Government Operations and Politics

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-06-18: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Last Updated

2026-03-30T19:31:46Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Election Worker Protection Act of 2025 aims to strengthen safeguards for individuals involved in administering federal elections by providing federal funding for recruitment, training, and safety measures; enhancing law enforcement resources; and creating new criminal penalties for threats, harassment, and unauthorized disclosure of personal information. It seeks to ensure election workers can perform their duties without fear of intimidation or violence, thereby supporting the integrity and smooth operation of elections.

Key Provisions

• Grants for Recruitment and Training (Section 3, adding Sections 297 and 298 to the Help America Vote Act of 2002 - HAVA):
• The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) will provide grants to states (or local governments if states decline) starting one year after enactment, based on each state's share of the national voting-age population.
• Funds support recruiting and training poll workers and volunteers, emphasizing youth, diversity (including race, ethnicity, and disability), and culturally competent training for serving voters with limited English proficiency, disabilities, or diverse backgrounds.
• Recipients must use EAC materials, involve adult learning experts, report activities to Congress, and ensure funds supplement (not replace) existing budgets.
• Authorization: Ongoing appropriations from fiscal year 2026, with up to 3% for EAC administration.

• Grants for Election Worker Safety (Section 3, adding Section 298 to HAVA):
• Similar grant structure for physical security services (e.g., protection details) and social media threat monitoring.
• States or locals must apply, report usage, and ensure supplemental funding.
• EAC reports to Congress on grants and recommendations for safety improvements.

• Department of Justice (DOJ) Training Resources (Section 4):
• Within 180 days of enactment, the Attorney General must review and expand DOJ training for federal, state, local, and Tribal law enforcement on detecting, deterring, and investigating threats to election workers.
• Training also provided to DOJ prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys for prosecuting such threats.

• Grant Program to Protect Personal Information (Section 5):
• DOJ establishes grants for states, local governments, or their agencies to create or expand programs redacting or removing election workers' personally identifiable information (e.g., addresses, phone numbers) from public databases and records.
• Supports hiring third parties for redactions, improving protocols to prevent releases, modifying databases, and opt-out systems for workers.
• Applications required; Comptroller General reports biennially on spending, with states/locals submitting usage details within 180 days.
• Authorization: Necessary appropriations.

• Criminal Prohibition on Harassment (Section 6):
• Adds new Section 612 to 18 U.S.C. (federal criminal code), making it illegal to intimidate, threaten, or coerce election workers (officials, poll workers, or volunteers) while performing duties or in retaliation for those duties.
• Penalties: Fine up to $100,000, up to 5 years imprisonment, or both.
• FBI Director assigns a special agent per field office to investigate threats.

• Expanded Intimidation Crimes (Section 7):
• Amends the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (52 U.S.C. 20511) to include intimidation of ballot processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, or certifying results as a federal crime (punishable by up to 1 year in prison).

• Prohibition on Doxxing (Section 8):
• Amends 18 U.S.C. Section 119 (on restricted personal information) to include election workers, making it a crime to knowingly share their personal details online with intent to threaten or facilitate harm (existing penalties apply: up to 5 years imprisonment).

• Poll Observer Interference Prevention (Section 9, adding Section 303A to HAVA):
• Allows state or local officials to remove poll observers from polling places or vote-counting sites if they reasonably believe the observer is engaging in (or about to engage in) intimidation, deception, or disruption prohibited by federal law.
• Does not limit other grounds for removal; applies to federal elections after enactment.
• EAC must issue related guidance by January 1, 2026.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Amendments to HAVA (2002): Adds a new Part 7 to Subtitle D (Title II) for recruitment/training/safety grants and a new Section 303A to Subtitle A (Title III) for poll observer rules, expanding federal support beyond voting systems to worker protections.
• Criminal Code Updates (18 U.S.C.): Introduces a standalone harassment offense (Section 612) and extends doxxing protections (Section 119) and intimidation crimes (via NVRA cross-reference) specifically to election workers, filling gaps in prior laws focused on voters rather than administrators.
• NVRA (1993) Amendment: Broadens voter intimidation provisions to cover post-voting processes like tabulation and certification, which were not explicitly included before.
• These changes integrate protections into existing election frameworks without altering core voting rights, but they increase federal oversight and funding requirements.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: EAC and DOJ gain new grant administration and training duties, potentially straining resources but improving coordination with states/locals. FBI field offices will dedicate agents to threat investigations, enhancing federal response capacity.
• On Citizens and Elections: Could lead to more reliable elections by recruiting diverse, trained workers and reducing disruptions, indirectly benefiting voters through safer, more accessible polling. However, it may increase administrative costs for states/locals, possibly passed to taxpayers.
• On International Relations: Minimal direct impact, though stronger U.S. election security could bolster global perceptions of democratic integrity.
• Overall, aims to mitigate rising threats (e.g., harassment post-2020 elections), potentially reducing worker shortages and boosting participation in election administration.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Election Workers: Primary beneficiaries, gaining safety measures, personal data protections, and legal recourse against threats.
• States and Local Governments: Eligible for grants but must apply, report, and implement programs; political subdivisions can access funds if states opt out.
• Federal Agencies: EAC (grant oversight), DOJ/FBI (training, investigations, prosecutions), and Comptroller General (reporting).
• Voters and Poll Observers: Indirectly affected—voters may experience smoother processes; observers face clearer rules on conduct to prevent interference.
• Law Enforcement: State, local, Tribal, and federal entities receive enhanced training and tools for threat response.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Establishes clearer federal standards for protecting election administrators, potentially increasing prosecutions under expanded criminal statutes. Emphasizes "reasonable basis" for actions like observer removal to avoid arbitrary enforcement.
• Constitutional: Balances First Amendment rights (e.g., for observers) against preventing intimidation, aligning with precedents like Burson v. Freeman (1992) on electioneering restrictions. Privacy protections for personal data invoke Fourth Amendment considerations but are framed as voluntary opt-outs. No major challenges anticipated, as it targets threats rather than speech.
• Political: Sponsored by a bipartisan group of senators, it addresses documented increases in election worker threats without partisan voting changes, potentially fostering cross-aisle support for election security. Could influence future legislation on democracy protections but may face debate over federal overreach into state election administration.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN]

Cosponsors (17)

Sen. Durbin, Richard J. [D-IL], Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA], Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH], Sen. Whitehouse, Sheldon [D-RI], Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO], Sen. Merkley, Jeff [D-OR], Sen. Blumenthal, Richard [D-CT], Sen. Reed, Jack [D-RI], Sen. Schatz, Brian [D-HI], Sen. Welch, Peter [D-VT], Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV], Sen. Schiff, Adam B. [D-CA], Sen. Markey, Edward J. [D-MA], Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI], Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT], Sen. Warner, Mark R. [D-VA], Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Recent Actions

• 2025-06-18: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
• 2025-06-18: Introduced in Senate

Bill Versions

• Election Worker Protection Act of 2025 — issued 2025-06-18 — PDF (21 pages)