ETAP Act of 2025

Bill Number

S. 1902

Origin Chamber

Senate

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Energy

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-05-22: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

Last Updated

2026-03-24T12:48:03Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Energy Threat Analysis Program Act of 2025 (S. 1902) aims to strengthen the security and resilience of the U.S. energy sector by requiring the Secretary of Energy to establish a dedicated program for analyzing threats, fostering public-private collaboration, and coordinating with other government entities. It builds on an existing initiative from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act to address vulnerabilities from cyberattacks, nation-state adversaries, and other risks to energy infrastructure.

Key Provisions

• Establishment of the Program: The Department of Energy (DOE) must create the Energy Threat Analysis Program (ETAP), managed by the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response and supported by the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. This includes setting up an Energy Threat Analysis Center as a physical hub and additional facilities for operational collaboration.
• Core Activities:
• Enhance awareness and analysis of threats to energy security.
• Identify mitigation strategies for energy systems.
• Support emergency response, restoration, and research on critical energy technologies.
• Test DOE's emergency capabilities and expand intelligence sharing.
• Improve tools for monitoring the energy sector and boost participation in the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (a industry group for sharing threat data).
• Functions and Collaboration:
• Promote sharing of threat information between government and private industry to develop actionable advice on defense, response, and resilience.
• Deepen understanding of risks from adversaries, including tactics of threat actors (e.g., hackers or foreign governments).
• Coordinate with federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
• Consult with state, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, as well as private energy stakeholders (e.g., manufacturers and vendors).
• Leverage resources from national labs, commercial cybersecurity firms, and energy vendors.
• Administration and Safeguards:
• DOE assistance is at the Secretary's discretion and does not create enforceable rights for recipients.
• Excludes "entities of concern" (e.g., foreign companies tied to adversaries, as defined in existing law).
• The program terminates after 10 years.
• Exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which governs advisory groups to streamline operations.
• Information shared is protected from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and similar state/local laws, treating it as voluntary and sensitive.
• Reporting and Funding: Requires an annual report to Congress on achievements and improvements. Authorizes $50 million in funding for fiscal years 2025–2029.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Expands the program under section 40125(c) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (2021) by adding a structured threat analysis framework, physical centers, and enhanced interagency coordination.
• Introduces new exemptions from disclosure laws and FACA, which were not specified in the prior law, to facilitate secure information sharing.
• Mandates exclusion of entities of concern, aligning with but extending restrictions from the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (2022).

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Enhances DOE's role in energy security, requiring closer integration with DHS (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), DOD (e.g., Cyber Command), and intelligence agencies, potentially improving federal response to energy disruptions but increasing coordination demands.
• Citizens and Economy: Bolsters protection of critical energy infrastructure (e.g., power grids, oil/gas systems), reducing risks of outages or economic harm from threats; indirect benefits include safer public health and economic stability, though citizens may have limited direct involvement.
• International Relations: Strengthens U.S. defenses against foreign adversaries (e.g., nation-states), potentially deterring cyberattacks on energy; could influence alliances through shared intelligence but raises tensions with excluded foreign entities.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Federal Government: DOE (primary implementer), DHS, DOD, DOJ, ODNI, and other agencies involved in cybersecurity and intelligence.
• Private Sector: Energy companies, utilities, manufacturers, vendors, and cybersecurity firms participating in information sharing and mitigation efforts.
• Non-Federal Entities: State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments; industry groups like the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
• Broader Public: U.S. energy consumers and the economy, indirectly through improved sector resilience.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: The discretionary nature of assistance and FOIA exemptions protect sensitive data but limit public accountability and potential lawsuits over information access. Exclusion of entities of concern reinforces national security laws without creating new enforcement mechanisms.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's authority over national defense and commerce (e.g., protecting interstate energy infrastructure); exemptions from disclosure support executive branch flexibility in intelligence matters but could raise First Amendment concerns if overly broad (though the bill frames it as voluntary sharing).
• Political: Temporary 10-year sunset clause allows for future evaluation and renewal, reflecting bipartisan sponsorship (introduced by Sens. Risch and Hickenlooper). Promotes public-private partnerships, which may face scrutiny over industry influence, but emphasizes neutrality in threat analysis to avoid politicization of energy security.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

Cosponsors (1)

Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

Recent Actions

• 2025-05-22: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
• 2025-05-22: Introduced in Senate

Bill Versions

• Energy Threat Analysis Program Act of 2025 — issued 2025-05-22 — PDF (9 pages)