Preventing PLA Acquisition of United States Technology Act of 2025
- Bill Number
- S. 1754
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-05-14: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- Last Updated
- 2025-07-15T11:03:18Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The legislation aims to counter the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) military-civil fusion strategy—a plan to blend civilian and military resources for advancing technologies that could benefit China's military, such as the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It seeks to prevent U.S. entities from contributing to the development of dual-use technologies (those with both civilian and military applications) in China through research collaborations or exchanges.
Key Provisions
- Definitions:
- Chinese entity of concern: Includes specific Chinese universities involved in military-related activities (e.g., the "Seven Sons of National Defense" group, those funded by the PLA, or hosting military labs); government-owned enterprises; private Chinese companies with military licenses, subcontracts, or ties to CCP leadership; and entities already identified by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as Chinese military companies.
- Covered entity: U.S. federal agencies funding research (e.g., National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health); U.S. universities or private research institutions receiving federal funds; and U.S.-headquartered private companies receiving federal funds.
- Federal financial assistance: Any grants, loans, or other support from the U.S. government, as defined in federal regulations.
- Military-civil fusion strategy: The CCP's approach to using civilian expertise and resources for military goals, like technology development and logistics.
- Prohibitions:
- Covered entities are banned from conducting scientific research or technical exchanges with Chinese entities of concern in areas with potential dual-use for military purposes (e.g., artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology).
- U.S. private companies receiving federal funds cannot form partnerships to evade these restrictions.
- Website Requirement:
- The Secretary of Defense (SecDef), consulting other agencies (e.g., State, Intelligence, FBI, Energy, Education, Treasury, Commerce), must create and update (at least twice yearly) a public website listing prohibited research fields (initially including quantum computing, robotics, semiconductors, 5G telecom, aerospace, and more) and, where possible, Chinese entities of concern.
- The list draws from Chinese government designations of defense-related fields (over 280 as of enactment) and may reference external trackers like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's China Defense Universities Tracker.
- Exception:
- The bans do not apply to collaborative research that does not significantly advance China's military-civil fusion goals, as determined by SecDef regulations.
- Reporting Requirements:
- Covered entities must submit annual reports to SecDef (starting 180 days after enactment) detailing any current, considered, or terminated research ties with Chinese entities of concern, including reasons for terminations.
- SecDef may hire independent auditors to verify compliance.
- Enforcement:
- Violations by non-federal covered entities result in ineligibility for future federal funds.
- SecDef must issue regulations for enforcement and coordinate with other agencies.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Introduces new, targeted prohibitions on U.S.-China research collaborations, building on prior laws like the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (which identifies Chinese military companies) but expanding to a broader definition of "Chinese entities of concern" and specific dual-use tech fields.
- Adds mandatory annual reporting and a public website for transparency, which did not exist before.
- Establishes penalties tied directly to federal funding eligibility, strengthening enforcement beyond existing export controls or sanctions on dual-use technologies.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Agencies like DoD, NSF, and NIH will face increased administrative burdens for website maintenance, regulation issuance, audits, and coordination, potentially slowing research funding processes.
- Citizens and U.S. Institutions: U.S. researchers, universities, and companies may lose access to Chinese collaborators or markets in key tech areas, limiting innovation opportunities but enhancing national security by reducing tech leakage. This could raise research costs or redirect partnerships to non-Chinese entities.
- International Relations: May strain U.S.-China academic and scientific ties, escalating tensions over technology competition. It signals a harder U.S. stance on China's military ambitions, potentially prompting retaliatory measures from China affecting U.S. exports or students.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Federal Agencies: DoD (lead enforcer), NSF, NIH, and others involved in research funding or oversight.
- U.S. Academia and Research Institutions: Universities and private labs receiving federal support, which may need to sever or scrutinize China ties.
- U.S. Private Sector: Tech and research companies headquartered in the U.S. and reliant on federal funds or grants.
- Chinese Entities: Universities, state-owned enterprises, and private firms with military links, facing reduced U.S. collaboration opportunities.
- Broader Research Community: Scientists and innovators in dual-use fields, who may experience disrupted global networks.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Relies on federal funding conditions to enforce bans, which is constitutional under Congress's spending power (ability to attach strings to federal money). However, it may face challenges if seen as overly broad restrictions on academic freedom or international exchanges; exceptions and regulations aim to mitigate this.
- Constitutional: Could raise First Amendment concerns (free speech and association in research), but courts have upheld similar limits on federally funded activities for national security (e.g., export controls). No direct impact on private, unfunded research.
- Political: Reinforces bipartisan U.S. efforts to curb China's technological rise, aligning with broader Indo-Pacific strategy. It may politicize scientific collaborations, influencing future U.S. foreign policy debates on decoupling from China versus maintaining global research openness.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (1)
Recent Actions
- 2025-05-14: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- 2025-05-14: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Preventing PLA Acquisition of United States Technology Act of 2025 — issued 2025-05-14 — PDF (10 pages)