Countering Corrupt Political (CCP) Influence Act
- Bill Number
- S. 1623
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-05-06: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- Last Updated
- 2025-09-22T15:51:38Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The Countering Corrupt Political (CCP) Influence Act aims to promote transparency and reciprocity in interactions between officials from certain adversarial countries and U.S. state, local, educational, or research entities. It requires advance notification of such meetings or visits to the U.S. Department of State, building on similar past practices to monitor potential foreign influence activities.
Key Provisions
- Advance Notification Requirement: Foreign missions from "covered countries" must notify the Department of State at least 96 hours before any meetings between their officials or representatives and U.S. state or local officials, or official visits to U.S. educational or research institutions.
- Covered individuals include members of the foreign mission in the U.S., the country's permanent mission to the United Nations, and any officials traveling to the U.S. for official business.
- Notifications must detail the date, location, participants' names, and purpose of the meeting or visit.
- Monthly Reporting to Congress: The Secretary of State must submit monthly reports to specified congressional committees listing all notified meetings and visits. The first report includes historical data collected by the Department since 2019.
- Threat Assessment Report: Within 4 years and 6 months of enactment, a joint report from the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Attorney General must assess threats posed by each covered country and recommend policy changes for U.S. diplomats in those countries. The report will be unclassified but may include a classified annex.
- Sunset Clause: All requirements expire 5 years after enactment.
- Definitions:
- Covered Countries: People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan (while under Taliban control).
- Appropriate Congressional Committees: Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security.
- Taliban: The designated terrorist entity or its successor in Afghanistan.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Formalizes and expands a 2019 Department of State practice of requiring similar notifications, making it a statutory mandate specifically for the listed covered countries.
- Introduces a structured monthly reporting system to Congress and a comprehensive interagency threat assessment, which were not previously required by law.
- Limits the provision's duration to 5 years, allowing for future review or extension.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Increases administrative workload for the Department of State in enforcing notifications and preparing reports; other agencies (e.g., intelligence and defense) must collaborate on the threat assessment, potentially enhancing interagency coordination on foreign influence threats.
- Citizens and Institutions: U.S. state and local officials, as well as educational and research institutions, may experience greater transparency in foreign interactions, reducing risks of undisclosed influence but possibly complicating routine engagements.
- International Relations: Could strain diplomatic ties with covered countries by imposing unilateral reporting obligations, signaling U.S. concerns over their influence operations; the reciprocal threat assessment may lead to policy adjustments affecting U.S. personnel abroad, such as enhanced security measures.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Federal Government: Department of State (primary enforcer), intelligence community, and congressional oversight committees.
- State and Local Governments: Officials who interact with foreign representatives, gaining visibility into such meetings.
- Educational and Research Institutions: Universities and labs hosting foreign visits, subject to indirect monitoring.
- Covered Countries: Their diplomatic missions and officials, facing new compliance burdens that may limit operational flexibility.
- U.S. Diplomats Abroad: Potential beneficiaries of recommended policy changes to counter similar influence in those countries.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Strengthens U.S. foreign affairs authority under the Constitution (Article I and II) by regulating foreign diplomatic activities on U.S. soil, without directly infringing on free speech or association rights, as it targets official government interactions.
- Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce and commerce with foreign nations (Article I, Section 8), promoting national security without overriding executive diplomatic prerogatives.
- Political: Highlights bipartisan concerns over foreign interference (introduced by Sens. Scott and Blackburn), potentially escalating tensions with listed nations but fostering domestic accountability; the 5-year sunset provides a mechanism for reevaluation amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (2)
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN], Sen. Moody, Ashley [R-FL]
Recent Actions
- 2025-05-06: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- 2025-05-06: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Countering Corrupt Political (CCP) Influence Act — issued 2025-05-06 — PDF (5 pages)