CAMPUS Act
- Bill Number
- S. 1010
- Origin Chamber
- Senate
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-03-12: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- Last Updated
- 2025-07-30T11:33:20Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose of the Legislation
The CAMPUS Act of 2025 (S. 1010) aims to protect U.S. national security by restricting federal funding, research partnerships, and visa access for entities connected to China's military-civil fusion strategy, which blends civilian and military efforts to advance the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It also promotes educational partnerships with Taiwan to enhance U.S. access to Mandarin language and Chinese cultural programs.
Key Provisions
- Identification of Chinese Entities (Section 2): The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), working with the Secretary of Defense, must identify Chinese higher education institutions that support the PLA, including those involved in military-civil fusion or China's defense industry. A list of these institutions must be submitted to relevant congressional committees within 180 days of enactment and annually thereafter.
- Prohibition on Department of Defense (DoD) Funding (Section 3): No DoD funds for research, development, testing, and evaluation can go to any U.S. entity that has a contract with a listed Chinese institution.
- Restrictions on Handling Classified Information (Section 4): The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency cannot approve a U.S. entity's facility for storing or hosting classified (secret or sensitive) information unless the entity certifies it has no active research partnership with a listed Chinese institution.
- Visa Denials (Section 5): The Secretary of State can deny nonimmigrant visas (F or J visas, typically for students and exchange visitors) to individuals who are students or employees of listed Chinese institutions.
- Limits on K-12 Education Funding (Section 6): No Department of Education (DoE) funds for K-12 (kindergarten through 12th grade) schools can be provided to schools that have contracts with any entity based in China.
- Promotion of Taiwan Partnerships (Section 7): Congress expresses support for expanding U.S.-Taiwan educational ties through the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. The Secretary of Education is authorized to award grants to K-12 schools and universities for Mandarin language instruction and Chinese cultural programs under the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative.
- Broader Funding Prohibitions (Section 8): Extends restrictions to prohibit DoD research funds from going to U.S. entities contracting with listed Chinese institutions or entities on the U.S. Commerce Department's Entity List (a roster of foreign entities posing national security risks, maintained under export control regulations).
- Foreign Gift Disclosure Changes (Section 9): Amends the Higher Education Act of 1965 to lower the reporting threshold for foreign gifts or contracts received by U.S. universities from $250,000 to $50,000 annually, requiring more disclosures to promote transparency.
- Definitions (Section 10): Clarifies terms like "appropriate committees of Congress" (key Senate and House panels on armed services, intelligence, and education), "institution of higher education domiciled in the People's Republic of China" (those controlled by China's Ministry of Education or defense-related agencies), and "K-12 education" (as defined in existing federal law on artificial intelligence initiatives).
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Introduces new requirements for DNI to compile and report on Chinese institutions supporting the PLA, with no prior equivalent mandate.
- Adds funding prohibitions for DoD and DoE tied to partnerships with Chinese entities, expanding beyond current export controls.
- Lowers the foreign gift disclosure threshold under the Higher Education Act, increasing reporting obligations for universities (previously $250,000 or more).
- Authorizes new grants for U.S.-Taiwan educational programs, building on but not replacing existing initiatives.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: DNI, DoD, DoE, and State Department will face increased administrative burdens for identifications, certifications, visa reviews, and grant management. This could strain resources for compliance monitoring.
- Citizens and Institutions: U.S. universities and K-12 schools may lose federal funding or research opportunities if they maintain ties to China, potentially limiting academic collaborations. Students and researchers could face barriers to classified work or international exchanges.
- International Relations: Strengthens U.S. stance against China's military advancements by targeting educational links, while bolstering ties with Taiwan through cultural and language programs. This may heighten U.S.-China tensions but foster goodwill with Taiwan.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Educational Institutions: Universities and K-12 schools reliant on federal funds or international partnerships, especially those with Chinese collaborations.
- Chinese Institutions and Individuals: Higher education entities supporting the PLA and their students/employees seeking U.S. visas.
- U.S. Government Entities: DNI, DoD, DoE, State Department, and congressional committees overseeing implementation.
- Taiwan-Related Organizations: American Institute in Taiwan and Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, benefiting from expanded partnerships.
- Researchers and Businesses: U.S. entities in defense, technology, and education sectors with contracts involving China.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Enhances national security tools by linking funding and visas to intelligence assessments, but requires careful enforcement to avoid violating anti-discrimination laws in visa processes. The Entity List integration aligns with existing export controls (under the Export Administration Regulations).
- Constitutional: Could raise First Amendment concerns if restrictions on academic partnerships are seen as limiting free speech or association, though national security justifications (similar to export controls) may provide legal cover. No direct challenges to due process are evident, as certifications and denials include appeal mechanisms under existing laws.
- Political: Signals bipartisan concern over China's influence in U.S. education, potentially influencing future foreign policy on technology transfer and intellectual property. It promotes a "de-risking" approach to China relations while supporting Taiwan, aligning with broader U.S. strategies in the Indo-Pacific region.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (2)
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN], Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
Recent Actions
- 2025-03-12: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- 2025-03-12: Introduced in Senate
Bill Versions
- Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025 — issued 2025-03-12 — PDF (6 pages)