Condemning the Trump administration for the use of an unauthorized method of communicating highly sensitive or potentially classified information regarding a United States military operation via the messaging platform "Signal".

Bill Number: H.Res. 265
Origin Chamber: House
Congress: 119th Congress, Session 1
Policy Area: Armed Forces and National Security
Status: Introduced
Latest Action: 2025-03-27: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Last Updated: 2025-06-06T14:17:56Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

This House Resolution (H. Res. 265) condemns the Trump administration for using the commercial messaging platform "Signal" to communicate highly sensitive or potentially classified information about a U.S. military operation. It highlights risks to national security and calls for reviews, investigations, and accountability to prevent unauthorized handling of such information.

Key Provisions

Background Clauses ("Whereas" Sections):
Lists specific Trump administration officials (e.g., Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and others) who allegedly used Signal for unauthorized discussions of sensitive military details.
Notes potential failures to document information under the Federal Records Act (a 1950 law requiring federal agencies to properly create, maintain, and dispose of records).
Cites risks from foreign adversaries like China and Russia, referencing past incidents such as China's 2024 infiltration of the U.S. Treasury and Russian cyberattacks (e.g., Moonlight Maze operation).
Mentions prior administration issues, like improper storage of classified documents at Mar-a-Lago, and discussions outside a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF, a secure room designed to prevent eavesdropping on classified talks).
Resolved Actions:
Condemns the administration for endangering national security by exposing information to adversaries and risking American servicemembers' lives through unsecured communications involving non-government parties.
Calls for the administration to:
Review communication procedures for classified information.
Investigate all used methods and ensure compliance with proper protocols.
Probe potential violations of federal laws on classified information handling.
Hold violators accountable under the law.
Examine Signal and other unapproved apps' usage by the National Security Council or executive officials.
Mandate SCIF use for sensitive discussions.
Inform and warn officials that violations outside SCIFs could lead to removal from office and legal punishment.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This is a non-binding resolution, so it introduces no changes to existing laws. It references but does not amend statutes like the Federal Records Act or rules on classified information (governed by laws such as the Espionage Act and executive orders). Instead, it urges enforcement and procedural improvements.

Potential Impacts

Government Agencies: May prompt internal reviews by the Department of Defense, State Department, intelligence agencies, and National Security Council, potentially leading to stricter communication policies and training on approved channels.
Citizens and Servicemembers: Highlights risks to U.S. troops by exposing military plans, which could indirectly affect public trust in government security practices; no direct impact on everyday citizens.
International Relations: Could signal U.S. vulnerabilities to adversaries, potentially encouraging foreign espionage; it underscores ongoing threats from nations like China and Russia, but as a domestic resolution, it has limited direct international effect.

Main Stakeholders Affected

Trump Administration Officials: Directly named individuals (e.g., Vance, Hegseth, Rubio) and broader executive branch members, facing calls for investigation and accountability.
Congress: The House of Representatives, particularly committees on Oversight and Government Reform, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence, tasked with reviewing the resolution.
National Security Entities: Agencies like the CIA, DNI office, and National Security Council, urged to overhaul communication tools and protocols.
U.S. Servicemembers: Indirectly affected through potential risks to military operations from leaked information.
Foreign Adversaries: Referenced as beneficiaries of security lapses, though not directly impacted.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

Legal: Reinforces obligations under the Federal Records Act and classified information laws (e.g., prohibiting unauthorized disclosure, which could lead to criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 793). It does not create new liabilities but pressures enforcement.
Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's oversight role (Article I) over the executive branch, including national security, but as a resolution, it lacks enforcement power and cannot compel action.
Political: Represents partisan criticism (introduced by Democrats), potentially escalating tensions between Congress and the executive branch; it could fuel debates on secure communications in government, especially with references to past controversies like Mar-a-Lago, influencing public discourse on accountability without binding outcomes.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Johnson, Julie [D-TX-32]

Cosponsors (13)

Rep. Tokuda, Jill N. [D-HI-2], Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large], Rep. Peters, Scott H. [D-CA-50], Rep. Johnson, Henry C. "Hank" [D-GA-4], Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36], Rep. Morelle, Joseph D. [D-NY-25], Rep. Thanedar, Shri [D-MI-13], Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32], Rep. Olszewski, Johnny [D-MD-2], Rep. Correa, J. Luis [D-CA-46], Rep. Brown, Shontel M. [D-OH-11], Rep. Williams, Nikema [D-GA-5], Rep. McGovern, James P. [D-MA-2]

Recent Actions

2025-03-27: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-03-27: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-03-27: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-03-27: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-03-27: Submitted in House
2025-03-27: Submitted in House

Bill Versions

Condemning the Trump administration for the use of an unauthorized method of communicating highly sensitive or potentially classified information regarding a United States military operation via the messaging platform "Signal". — issued 2025-03-27 — PDF (6 pages)