STEADFAST Act

Bill Number

H.R. 7418

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 2

Policy Area

Government Operations and Politics

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2026-05-14: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 8 - 3.

Last Updated

2026-06-02T13:14:00Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The STEADFAST Act (H.R. 7418) aims to repurpose federal funds previously used for public financing of presidential election campaigns into grants for states and territories. This shift focuses on improving the security of election systems for federal offices, such as by updating voting equipment and enhancing cybersecurity, to protect against threats and ensure reliable elections.

Key Provisions

• Election Security Grant Program: The Election Assistance Commission (EAC), an independent federal agency that helps manage election standards, will distribute grants to eligible states and territories (including Puerto Rico, Guam, and others) based on their number of registered voters.
• Eligibility Requirements: States must submit an application with a spending plan, certify they do not allow noncitizens to vote in public elections, agree to provide usage reports, and meet other EAC criteria.
• Allowed Uses of Funds: Grants can cover acquiring voting machines, cybersecurity protections for voting systems, physical security for storing equipment, modernizing voting components, printing secure paper ballots, and safeguarding electronic voter lists (poll books).
• Prohibited Uses: Funds cannot pay for general election worker training (except for equipment-specific training) or costs related to lawsuits or legal judgments.
• Vendor Rules: States must use EAC-certified vendors for funded activities; vendors cannot have previously donated directly to state or local election administration.
• Priorities for Funding: Preference goes to states that use verifiable paper ballots (for audits), actively prevent noncitizen voting (e.g., using federal verification tools), and require voters to show valid photo ID (like a driver's license, passport, or military ID) at polling places.
• Election Security Fund: A new special fund in the U.S. Treasury will be created, funded by voluntary taxpayer designations on income tax returns (similar to the old presidential fund checkbox). The federal government will match these designations from general revenues, with up to 5% usable for EAC administrative costs.
• Public Reporting and Transparency: States must report spending details publicly on their websites and to the EAC. The EAC must create a website section explaining the program and fund within 180 days of enactment, with tax forms linking to this info.
• Effective Date: Changes apply to tax years ending after December 31, 2025.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Redirects Taxpayer Designations: Amends the Internal Revenue Code (Section 6096) to change the voluntary income tax donation checkbox from supporting presidential campaigns to election security grants.
• Ends Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Terminates Chapters 95 and 96 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provided matching funds and grants for presidential candidates and conventions. Any remaining funds in the old Presidential Election Campaign Fund will transfer to the new Election Security Fund.
• Adds New Chapter to Tax Code: Inserts Chapter 97, establishing the grant program, fund, and definitions, while expanding "state" to include U.S. territories.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: The EAC gains a larger role in overseeing election security grants, vendor certifications, and reporting, potentially increasing its workload and budget needs. The Treasury Department will handle fund transfers and tax form updates.
• On Citizens: Voters may benefit from more secure elections through modernized systems and protections against interference, but the end of public campaign financing could limit candidate funding options, affecting how campaigns are run. Taxpayers' voluntary donations now support state-level security rather than national candidates.
• On International Relations: No direct impacts, though stronger U.S. election security could indirectly bolster confidence in democratic processes amid global concerns about foreign election meddling (e.g., cyberattacks).

Main Stakeholders Affected

• States and Territories: Primary recipients of grants; must comply with eligibility rules, which may encourage adoption of paper ballots, voter ID, and noncitizen voting checks.
• Election Officials and Administrators: Benefit from funds for equipment and security but face new reporting requirements and vendor restrictions.
• Taxpayers and Voters: Can still designate tax dollars voluntarily, but the focus shifts to local election integrity rather than federal campaigns.
• Vendors and Election Technology Providers: Must seek EAC certification to participate, excluding those with prior election funding ties.
• Political Candidates: Presidential hopefuls lose access to public matching funds, potentially increasing reliance on private donations.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal Implications: The bill amends federal tax law to redirect funds without creating new taxes, relying on existing voluntary mechanisms. It imposes conditions on grants (e.g., no noncitizen voting certification), which could lead to disputes if states challenge EAC oversight as overreach.
• Constitutional Implications: Relates to Article I, Section 4 (elections clause), empowering Congress to regulate federal elections. Requirements like photo ID and noncitizen checks may spark debates on voting access under the 14th and 15th Amendments (equal protection and voting rights), though the bill prioritizes security without mandating these statewide.
• Political Implications: Ends a 50-year-old public financing system (from the 1970s post-Watergate reforms), which could be seen as reducing government influence on campaigns but raising concerns about big-money politics. Grant priorities favor states with stricter voting rules, potentially influencing partisan divides on election integrity.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Bice, Stephanie I. [R-OK-5]

Cosponsors (4)

Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15], Rep. McDowell, Addison P. [R-NC-6], Rep. Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ-4], Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

Recent Actions

• 2026-05-14: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 8 - 3.
• 2026-05-14: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
• 2026-02-09: Referred to the Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2026-02-09: Referred to the Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2026-02-09: Introduced in House
• 2026-02-09: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Securing Tech and Election Administration Defenses For All States and Territories Act — issued 2026-02-09 — PDF (12 pages)