NASA C-UAS Act
- Bill Number
- H.R. 7379
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 2
- Policy Area
- Science, Technology, Communications
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2026-02-05: Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
- Last Updated
- 2026-06-03T08:06:40Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The NASA Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Authority Act (H.R. 7379) aims to grant the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) specific powers to detect, identify, monitor, and track unmanned aircraft systems (drones) that pose credible threats to high-risk NASA facilities and assets, particularly those related to space launches, reentries, and related operations. This enhances NASA's ability to protect its infrastructure while overriding certain existing privacy and communication laws under strict conditions.
Key Provisions
- Authority for Detection and Tracking: NASA personnel (including authorized contractors) may intercept or access communications controlling threatening drones without prior consent to detect, identify, monitor, or track them. This applies only to drones posing risks to "covered" NASA facilities or assets, defined through a risk-based assessment focusing on threats, airspace safety, and national security needs.
- Identification of Covered Facilities/Assets: NASA must inventory facilities/assets tied to launch services, reentry services, or protection of space vehicles/payloads (e.g., rockets or satellites). A risk assessment, coordinated with the Secretary of Transportation (via the Federal Aviation Administration or FAA), evaluates factors like airspace impacts, mitigation options, public access, and potential harm. High-risk sites are designated as "covered."
- Research, Testing, and Training: NASA can research, test, train on, and evaluate detection equipment, including electronic tools, without violating specified laws. Training is required for personnel, and all activities must ensure safe airspace operations in coordination with the FAA.
- Regulations and Coordination: NASA must issue guidance or regulations, consulting agencies like the FAA, FCC, and others. Actions must avoid interfering with airport operations, navigation, or airspace efficiency. Support can be provided to other federal agencies (e.g., Department of Defense or DHS) for similar counter-drone efforts, on a non-reimbursable basis within NASA's resources.
- Privacy Protections: Interceptions must comply with the First Amendment (free speech) and Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable searches). Communications are acquired only as needed, retained no longer than 180 days (with exceptions for legal or security needs), and disclosed only under limited circumstances, such as for law enforcement or national security.
- Reporting Requirements: Semiannual briefings to congressional committees (e.g., Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation; House Science, Space, and Technology) on activities, impacts, privacy policies, mitigations, and any legal gaps. Briefings are unclassified, with optional classified addendums.
- Limitations and Sunset: Authority is limited to specified actions, does not grant broader powers, and expires on September 30, 2031. Definitions include terms like "unmanned aircraft system" (from FAA law) and "personnel" (NASA officers, employees, or qualified contractors).
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Amends title 51 of the U.S. Code (NASA's organic act) by adding section 20150, providing NASA with new, targeted counter-drone authorities not previously explicit in its statute.
- Overrides select provisions in other laws, including:
- Title 49 (transportation, e.g., aircraft interference prohibitions).
- Title 18 (crimes, e.g., wiretapping, computer fraud, and interception laws).
- Communications Act of 1934 (privacy of communications).
- This expands counter-drone powers beyond agencies like the Department of Defense or Homeland Security (which have similar authorities under sections like 10 U.S.C. § 130i), tailoring them to NASA's space-related assets while emphasizing coordination to avoid overlap.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Strengthens NASA's security for critical space infrastructure, requiring closer coordination with the FAA to minimize airspace disruptions. Other agencies (e.g., DoD, DHS) may benefit from NASA's support, potentially improving overall federal counter-drone capabilities without new funding mandates.
- Citizens: Enhances protection near NASA sites (e.g., launch pads) from rogue drones, but introduces risks of privacy intrusions for drone operators whose communications could be intercepted. Safeguards limit scope, duration, and disclosure, aiming to balance security with civil liberties.
- International Relations: Minimal direct impact, though it could indirectly support U.S. space missions involving international partners (e.g., by securing launches), potentially reassuring allies about U.S. asset protection without affecting foreign drone operations abroad.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- NASA and Personnel: Gains new tools and responsibilities for facility security; contractors must meet strict training and operational criteria.
- FAA and Department of Transportation: Involved in assessments, coordination, and ensuring airspace safety; may receive or provide support.
- Drone Operators and Public: UAS users near covered sites face potential monitoring; citizens near NASA facilities benefit from heightened security but may experience indirect effects like temporary airspace notices.
- Congressional Committees: Receive ongoing oversight briefings to monitor implementation and recommend adjustments.
- Other Federal Agencies: Including DoD, DHS, FCC, and intelligence community; can request assistance and collaborate on privacy/law enforcement issues.
- Law Enforcement (Federal, State, Local): May access intercepted data for investigations, aiding broader security efforts.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Establishes a framework for limited surveillance of drone communications, with built-in compliance to federal wiretap and privacy laws (e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act). Requires minimization of signal disruptions and advance notices where safe, reducing liability risks. The sunset clause (2031) allows Congress to review and renew based on effectiveness.
- Constitutional: Explicitly mandates adherence to the First and Fourth Amendments, addressing free speech and search protections by limiting interceptions to threats and ensuring judicial oversight for extensions/disclosures. This mitigates challenges under privacy rights but could invite lawsuits if safeguards fail.
- Political: Temporarily expands federal counter-drone powers amid rising UAS threats to critical infrastructure, reflecting bipartisan interest in space security. The emphasis on privacy, reporting, and inter-agency coordination may ease concerns over overreach, but the overrides of existing laws could spark debates on balancing innovation (e.g., commercial drones) with national security.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]
Recent Actions
- 2026-02-05: Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
- 2026-02-04: Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-02-04: Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-02-04: Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-02-04: Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-02-04: Introduced in House
- 2026-02-04: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- NASA Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Authority Act — issued 2026-02-04 — PDF (19 pages)