PROTECT the Grid Act
- Bill Number
- H.R. 7208
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 2
- Policy Area
- Energy
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2026-01-23: Referred to the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.
- Last Updated
- 2026-07-09T17:41:17Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The PROTECT the Grid Act aims to protect the U.S. electric grid from potential cyber threats posed by high-wattage Internet-connected devices (like smart appliances) controlled through applications linked to foreign adversaries. It directs a federal report on these risks and codifies an existing executive order into law to secure the supply chain for information and communications technology.
Key Provisions
- Findings: The bill outlines congressional concerns about the growing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in homes, such as electric vehicle chargers and smart air conditioners, which consume over 500 watts of power. These devices, if controlled by apps from foreign adversaries (e.g., companies under Chinese government influence), could be used to manipulate electricity demand, causing grid instability, blackouts, or failures. It cites laws like China's Cybersecurity Law that require data sharing with the government and notes that foreign entities control over 25% of the U.S. major appliance market.
- Purposes: To strengthen national security efforts against supply chain risks, particularly from China, and to require a report ensuring that connected home appliances do not enable foreign interference with the grid.
- Definitions:
- High-wattage IoT device: Any Internet-connected appliance or tool using more than 500 watts, for home or business use.
- Foreign adversary: Countries designated as threats (e.g., China, based on U.S. law).
- Covered entity: Businesses under the control, ownership, or influence of a foreign adversary.
- Foreign adversary-controlled application: Apps, websites, or software operated by such entities.
- Other terms include critical infrastructure (essential systems like the power grid) and consumer product (everyday goods under consumer safety laws).
- Report Requirement (Section 4): The Secretary of Commerce must submit a report to Congress within 270 days of enactment, in coordination with other federal officials (e.g., from energy, intelligence, and homeland security). The report assesses:
- Deployment of high-wattage IoT devices nationwide.
- Risks from foreign-controlled apps destabilizing the grid (e.g., coordinated power surges).
- Potential national security effects, like cascading failures.
- Input from stakeholders such as industry experts, consumers, and importers.
- Recommendations, including:
- Applying Executive Order 13873 (on securing tech supply chains) to IoT devices.
- Banning federal purchases of products with foreign-controlled apps.
- Requiring certifications or labels for secure devices.
- Other mitigation steps.
- Codification of Executive Order (Section 5): Converts Executive Order 13873—issued in 2019 to block risky foreign tech transactions—into permanent U.S. law, including its full text in the statutes.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Transforms Executive Order 13873 from a temporary presidential directive (which could be reversed by future administrations) into statutory law, making supply chain security for tech and communications a fixed requirement.
- Introduces specific focus on IoT devices and grid vulnerabilities, which were not explicitly covered in prior laws, building on broader critical infrastructure protections under acts like the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001.
- No direct amendments to existing statutes, but the report could lead to new regulations on imports, procurement, and device standards.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: The Department of Commerce gains a lead role in assessing and recommending grid security measures, involving coordination with agencies like Energy, Homeland Security, and Intelligence. Federal procurement rules may tighten, limiting purchases of risky devices and increasing compliance costs.
- Citizens: Could enhance grid reliability, reducing blackout risks from cyber threats, but might raise appliance prices if certifications or import restrictions apply. Consumers may see more secure or labeled smart devices.
- International Relations: Heightens scrutiny of foreign tech firms (especially Chinese), potentially straining trade ties and escalating U.S.-China tensions over data security and supply chains. It signals stronger U.S. defenses against perceived adversarial influence.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Government: Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Homeland Security; Congress (via report oversight); federal buyers of appliances.
- Consumers and Households: Owners of smart home devices, who could benefit from safer products but face higher costs or choices.
- Industry: U.S. and foreign appliance manufacturers/importers (e.g., those controlling 25%+ of the market); tech firms developing IoT apps; electric utilities and grid operators vulnerable to demand manipulation.
- Foreign Entities: Companies from adversary nations (e.g., Chinese firms) subject to restrictions, data access mandates, or market exclusion.
- Other Groups: Consumer safety organizations, academic researchers (cited in findings), and domestic producers advocating for fair competition.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Codifying an executive order reduces reliance on presidential authority, providing stability but inviting court challenges if restrictions are seen as overbroad trade barriers. The report's recommendations could spur new regulations under existing laws like consumer product safety rules.
- Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's powers over commerce and national security (Article I, Section 8), but may raise First Amendment questions if app bans limit free speech or access to information; no direct privacy impacts, though it echoes data security concerns.
- Political: Reinforces bipartisan focus on China as a threat, potentially influencing future tech policy and elections. It promotes supply chain "reshoring" without mandating it, leaving room for executive discretion in implementations.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (2)
Rep. Stefanik, Elise M. [R-NY-21], Rep. Dunn, Neal P. [R-FL-2]
Recent Actions
- 2026-01-23: Referred to the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2026-01-22: Introduced in House
- 2026-01-22: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- Preventing Remote Operations by Threatening Entities on Critical Technology for the Grid Act — issued 2026-01-22 — PDF (10 pages)