AI OVERWATCH Act

Bill Number

H.R. 6875

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2026-01-21: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.

Last Updated

2026-07-07T08:05:31Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The AI OVERWATCH Act (H.R. 6875) aims to safeguard U.S. national security by restricting the export, reexport, or transfer of advanced integrated circuits—high-performance chips often used in artificial intelligence (AI) and computing—to countries deemed high-risk for military or cyber threats. It seeks to prevent these technologies from enhancing the capabilities of adversarial nations while allowing controlled access for trusted U.S. entities.

Key Provisions

• Definitions:
• Covered integrated circuits: Advanced chips, computers, or products with high processing performance (e.g., total processing performance of 1,600 or more, performance density of 3.2 or more, or high bandwidth metrics like 1,400 gigabytes per second). These are based on Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) like 3A090, which categorize items on the Commerce Control List (a U.S. regulatory list of controlled exports). Excludes chips not designed for data centers. The Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security can update these technical parameters after 18 months, with approval from the Operating Committee for Export Policy (a interagency group).
• Countries of concern: China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro's regime.
• Trusted U.S. person: A U.S. company or individual meeting strict security and ownership standards, designated by the Under Secretary.

• License Requirements:
• Starting upon enactment, a license is mandatory for any export, reexport, or in-country transfer (movement within a foreign country) of covered integrated circuits to entities located in, headquartered in, or owned by parents in a country of concern.
• No general licenses (broad approvals without case-by-case review) are allowed.
• Before approving a license, the Under Secretary must submit detailed certifications to Congress (House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Banking Committee), including:
• Item details (quantity, specs).
• End-user information and license conditions.
• Assurances that the transfer won't support military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber activities in the country of concern, addressing risks like China's military-civil fusion policy (where civilian tech aids military efforts).
• Confirmations that it won't harm U.S. supply chains or America's lead in AI (e.g., processing power capacity and global market share).
• Technical assessments from agencies like the Director of National Intelligence.
• Licenses cannot be issued until 30 days after congressional submission, and Congress can block them via a joint resolution (fast-tracked procedure).

• Exemptions and Implementation:
• Exempts transfers owned and controlled by trusted U.S. persons to non-concern countries, if security standards are met (e.g., cybersecurity, limits on foreign ownership from concern countries, U.S. sourcing preferences, annual audits).
• Within 90 days of enactment, the Under Secretary must create regulations for designating trusted persons and consider extending exemptions to U.S. allies.
• Terminates all pre-enactment licenses to concern-country entities.
• Imposes a 14-day ban on new licenses until a required national security strategy is submitted to Congress.

• National Security Strategy:
• The Secretary of Commerce, coordinating with other agencies (State, Defense, Energy, Trade Representative, Treasury, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy) and consulting the Director of National Intelligence, must deliver a report assessing:
• Risks of concern countries accessing U.S. or allied chips and equipment.
• Impacts on their military/cyber capabilities.
• China's chip production for 2026, including whether U.S. exports would reduce their indigenous (homegrown) efforts, comparisons to U.S./allied capabilities, and AI scenarios if they rely only on domestic tech.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (which governs U.S. export controls on dual-use technologies—items with both civilian and military applications) by adding a new Section 1758A. Key changes include:

• Introducing specific, performance-based controls on AI-enabling chips, expanding beyond general ECCN rules to target "weaponizable" advanced tech.
• Mandating congressional pre-approval and veto power for licenses, shifting more oversight from the executive branch to Congress (unlike routine export processes).
• Creating a "trusted U.S. person" exemption framework, which formalizes secure supply chain preferences not previously detailed in law.
• Requiring a comprehensive interagency strategy on AI/semiconductor risks, filling a gap in prior export laws focused on broader categories rather than AI-specific threats.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), requiring coordination with interagency groups and Congress. Could slow export processing but enhance security reviews. The 14-day ban and strategy report may delay implementations initially.
• On Citizens and Businesses: U.S. semiconductor firms (e.g., those producing AI chips) face stricter export barriers to major markets like China, potentially reducing revenue but protecting intellectual property. Trusted U.S. persons gain streamlined operations abroad, encouraging domestic manufacturing. Consumers may see indirect effects via supply chain stability.
• On International Relations: Heightens tensions with countries of concern by curbing tech access, potentially escalating trade disputes (e.g., with China on AI leadership). Strengthens ties with allies through possible exemption expansions and shared supply chain strategies, promoting U.S.-led global standards.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Tech and Semiconductor Industry: Companies like NVIDIA or Intel, which design/export high-performance chips; they must navigate new licensing and trusted status rules.
• Government Entities: BIS (lead agency), other export policy committees, and congressional committees overseeing foreign affairs and banking.
• Countries of Concern and Their Entities: Governments and firms in listed nations, facing restricted access to U.S. tech, which could hinder AI/military development.
• U.S. Allies and Partners: Beneficiaries of potential exemptions and strategy consultations, aiding collaborative tech ecosystems (e.g., in Europe or Asia-Pacific).
• End-Users: Data centers, AI developers, and researchers globally, with U.S.-based ones potentially gaining a competitive edge.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces export control laws by specifying AI tech, but the ability to update parameters via interagency vote provides flexibility without new legislation. Certifications must ensure "verifiable and enforceable" conditions, which could lead to legal challenges if deemed overly vague or burdensome under administrative law.
• Constitutional: Balances executive export authority (under Commerce Clause and foreign affairs powers) with congressional oversight via the 30-day review and joint resolution veto, aligning with Article I's role in regulating commerce but potentially inviting disputes over separation of powers if vetoes are frequent.
• Political: Targets AI competition, especially with China, amid bipartisan concerns over tech supremacy (introduced by a mix of Republicans). Could influence U.S. trade policy, supporting "friend-shoring" (shifting supply chains to allies) but risking retaliation; the strategy report may inform future budgets or sanctions, amplifying geopolitical focus on semiconductors as a "new oil."

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Cosponsors (37)

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4], Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2], Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40], Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3], Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1], Rep. LaHood, Darin [R-IL-16], Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10], Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8], Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7], Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large], Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4], Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6], Rep. Moran, Nathaniel [R-TX-1], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17], Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7], Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5], Rep. Newhouse, Dan [R-WA-4], Rep. Kamlager-Dove, Sydney [D-CA-37], Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32], Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27], Del. Radewagen, Aumua Amata Coleman [R-AS-At Large], Rep. Biggs, Sheri [R-SC-3], Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3], Rep. Taylor, David J. [R-OH-2], Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1], Rep. Haridopolos, Mike [R-FL-8], Rep. Harrigan, Pat [R-NC-10], Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23], Rep. Kiggans, Jennifer A. [R-VA-2], Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6], Rep. Magaziner, Seth [D-RI-2], Rep. Stauber, Pete [R-MN-8], Rep. Dunn, Neal P. [R-FL-2], Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2], Rep. Weber, Randy K. Sr. [R-TX-14], Rep. Crane, Elijah [R-AZ-2], Rep. Palmer, Gary J. [R-AL-6]

Recent Actions

• 2026-01-21: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.
• 2026-01-21: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
• 2025-12-18: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-12-18: Introduced in House
• 2025-12-18: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Artificial Intelligence Oversight of Verified Exports and Restrictions on Weaponizable Advanced Technology to Covered High-Risk Actors Act — issued 2025-12-18 — PDF (15 pages)