Securing Energy Supply Chains Act

Bill Number

H.R. 6853

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Energy

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-12-18: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Last Updated

2026-01-26T12:41:20Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Securing Energy Supply Chains Act (H.R. 6853) aims to protect U.S. national security, energy security, economic security, public safety, and foreign policy by requiring the Secretary of Energy to identify entities engaged in harmful activities and prohibiting the Department of Energy (DOE) from procuring goods or services from them, with a focus on critical materials and batteries in energy supply chains.

Key Provisions

• Energy Non-Procurement List Establishment: Within 90 days of enactment, the Secretary of Energy must create and maintain a list of entities deemed detrimental to U.S. interests based on available information. The list prioritizes entities involved in producing, manufacturing, processing, extracting, recycling, assembling, or providing critical materials (essential minerals like lithium or cobalt used in energy technologies) or batteries (including components). Entities can be added if they are owned, controlled, or influenced by a "foreign entity of concern" (defined in existing law as certain foreign adversaries, primarily in China), or if they appear on other U.S. government lists such as the Chinese Military Company List, the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list (blocked persons under sanctions), foreign terrorist organizations list, or Consolidated Screening List. Subsidiaries, parent companies, or other harmful entities may also be included. The list must be revised annually, with consultations from other federal agencies allowed.

• Reporting Requirements: Annually, starting one year after enactment, the Secretary must submit a report to Senate and House committees on energy, including the updated list (unclassified) and justifications for additions or removals (classified annex). The unclassified report must be published on the DOE website.

• Procurement Prohibition: One year after enactment, DOE cannot enter or renew contracts for goods or services with "covered" individuals or entities (those on the list or those funding/procuring from listed entities) unless no alternative source exists that meets project needs in terms of manner, time, or quantity. DOE contractors and first-tier subcontractors (for amounts over $250,000) face the same restrictions. Bidders must certify they are not covered. If a covered entity is discovered during a contract, it must be terminated unless an exception applies (e.g., no alternatives or good-faith error by the subcontractor). Exceptions require a report to Congress detailing the contract, alternative sources analysis, and recommendations for developing domestic alternatives.

• List Overlap Study: Within one year, the Secretary of Energy, coordinating with secretaries of Commerce, Defense, State, Treasury, the Director of National Intelligence, and others, must study overlaps among federal lists related to foreign entities of concern, sanctioned entities, Chinese military companies, procurement prohibitions, and those tied to the Chinese Communist Party. A report to Congress must include study results and recommendations to harmonize these lists for clearer federal contracting guidance.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill introduces a new, energy-specific "Energy Non-Procurement List" that builds on but expands existing federal restrictions, such as those in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (defining foreign entities of concern) and various sanction/procurement lists from Defense, Treasury, State, and Commerce. It adds tailored prohibitions for DOE contracts and subcontractors, including certification and termination requirements not previously specified for energy supply chains. It also mandates a first-of-its-kind interagency study to align overlapping federal lists, potentially streamlining but also centralizing restrictions on energy-related procurements.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: The DOE will face new administrative burdens in list maintenance, reporting, and procurement vetting, potentially delaying contracts and increasing compliance costs. Other agencies (e.g., Defense, Commerce) may need to collaborate more closely, leading to harmonized policies but possible resource strains.

• Citizens and Economy: U.S. energy projects could see supply chain disruptions if alternatives to listed entities are unavailable, raising costs for batteries and critical materials used in electric vehicles, renewables, and infrastructure. Over time, it may boost domestic manufacturing by encouraging alternatives, benefiting U.S. workers in energy sectors.

• International Relations: Targets foreign entities (especially Chinese) could strain trade ties with China and other adversaries, escalating tensions in global supply chains for critical minerals. It may encourage allies to adopt similar restrictions, strengthening U.S.-led coalitions on energy security.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Department of Energy and Federal Agencies: Primary implementers, including DOE contractors and subcontractors in energy projects.
• Energy Industry: Manufacturers, suppliers, and firms in critical materials, batteries, and related technologies, particularly those reliant on foreign sources.
• Foreign Entities: Companies owned or influenced by foreign adversaries (e.g., Chinese firms on existing lists), facing U.S. market exclusion.
• Congress: Receives reports and oversees exceptions, influencing energy policy.
• U.S. Taxpayers and Consumers: Indirectly affected through higher energy costs or improved supply chain resilience.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Enhances executive authority in national security via list-based restrictions, but exceptions and good-faith provisions mitigate overreach. Aligns with existing sanction laws (e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act), reducing litigation risks, though challenges could arise over due process for listed entities or classification of justifications.

• Constitutional: Supports Congress's commerce and spending powers (Article I) by regulating federal procurements, while advancing foreign affairs authority. No direct First Amendment issues, but classified elements could limit transparency.

• Political: Reinforces bipartisan focus on countering Chinese influence in strategic sectors like clean energy, potentially polarizing debates on trade vs. security. Could influence future legislation on supply chain resilience, amid ongoing U.S.-China rivalry.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Fallon, Pat [R-TX-4]

Recent Actions

• 2025-12-18: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
• 2025-12-18: Introduced in House
• 2025-12-18: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Securing Energy Supply Chains Act — issued 2025-12-18 — PDF (9 pages)