Biological Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2025
- Bill Number
- H.R. 6624
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2026-04-22: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 30 - 14.
- Last Updated
- 2026-06-02T19:38:03Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The Biological Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2025 aims to safeguard U.S. national security by restricting the export of sensitive intellectual property and information related to synthetic biology—particularly digital sequences of synthetic DNA or RNA—to foreign entities that could pose risks, such as those linked to adversarial nations like China. It addresses concerns over intellectual property theft and the potential misuse of such technology for military or intelligence purposes.
Key Provisions
- Sense of Congress: Expresses that China is systematically accessing U.S. data and intellectual property to advance its military, enable human rights abuses, and develop dual-use technologies (technologies that can serve both civilian and military purposes). It highlights China's military-civil fusion strategy, which integrates civilian companies into national security efforts, and cites Chinese laws (e.g., National Security Law of 2015, National Intelligence Law of 2017) that require citizens and organizations to cooperate with intelligence activities. The provision emphasizes the risks of exporting synthetic DNA/RNA sequences, which could reveal U.S. biotechnology designs, and urges controls on such exports to adversaries.
- License Requirement: Amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to require a license from the Secretary (likely of Commerce) for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of digital sequences of synthetic DNA or RNA (designed by humans or artificial intelligence) to a "foreign entity of concern." This requirement takes effect no later than one year after enactment.
- Exception: The license is not needed for information that is publicly available or otherwise exempt under section 734.3(b) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which covers items generally accessible to the public.
- Definitions:
- Digital sequence: A digital file representing the identity, order, and any chemical modifications in a DNA or RNA molecule.
- Foreign country of concern: Refers to countries like China, as defined in the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (e.g., nations posing national security risks).
- Foreign entity of concern: Includes government entities from such countries, foreign persons under their jurisdiction or laws, or entities owned, directed, or controlled by them.
- Synthetic DNA or RNA: Artificially constructed or chemically synthesized nucleic acid molecules (building blocks of genetic material) that can replicate in cells or pair with natural ones, including their replicas.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Inserts a new section (1758A) into Part I of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, expanding export controls specifically to synthetic biology technologies.
- Introduces targeted licensing for digital genetic sequences, building on but not altering broader export rules; it focuses on human- or AI-designed synthetic DNA/RNA, which was not explicitly covered before.
- Ties definitions to existing laws (e.g., foreign country of concern from a 2022 act), ensuring consistency without redefining core terms.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: The Department of Commerce (via the Bureau of Industry and Security) will handle licensing reviews, increasing administrative workload for enforcement and compliance monitoring. Other agencies like Defense or State may provide input on national security risks.
- Citizens and Businesses: U.S. biotechnology companies, researchers, and gene synthesis firms face new export hurdles, potentially delaying international collaborations or sales but protecting proprietary designs from theft. This could raise costs for compliance but foster domestic innovation by reducing foreign risks.
- International Relations: May heighten tensions with countries like China by limiting access to U.S. genetic data, signaling a tougher U.S. stance on technology transfers. It could encourage allies to adopt similar controls, strengthening global supply chain security, but risk retaliatory measures from affected nations.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Biotechnology Sector: Companies and researchers involved in synthetic biology, gene editing (e.g., CRISPR), or AI-driven design, who must navigate new licensing for exports.
- Foreign Entities: Governments, companies, and individuals in countries of concern (primarily China), facing restricted access to U.S. synthetic biology data.
- U.S. Government: Agencies enforcing export controls, balancing security with innovation.
- Academic and Research Institutions: U.S. and international collaborators, potentially impacted by delays in sharing genetic sequences for legitimate scientific purposes.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Strengthens export control frameworks under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (underlying the 2018 Reform Act), providing a statutory basis for targeted biotech restrictions without needing new regulations. The public availability exception aligns with First Amendment protections for open information.
- Constitutional: Export controls are a longstanding congressional power under Article I (regulating foreign commerce), with no apparent conflicts; it prioritizes national security over unrestricted trade.
- Political: Reflects bipartisan concerns over China’s technology acquisition strategies, potentially influencing broader U.S. policy on dual-use tech (e.g., integrating with CHIPS Act efforts). It underscores a shift toward proactive IP protection in emerging fields like synthetic biology, amid debates on innovation versus security.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Cosponsors (11)
Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6], Rep. Bice, Stephanie I. [R-OK-5], Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10], Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17], Rep. Harrigan, Pat [R-NC-10], Rep. Gill, Brandon [R-TX-26], Rep. McClain Delaney, April [D-MD-6], Rep. Davis, Donald G. [D-NC-1], Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40], Rep. Begich, Nicholas J. [R-AK-At Large], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
Recent Actions
- 2026-04-22: Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 30 - 14.
- 2026-04-22: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
- 2025-12-11: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- 2025-12-11: Introduced in House
- 2025-12-11: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- Biological Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2025 — issued 2025-12-11 — PDF (6 pages)