China AI Power Report Act

Bill Number

H.R. 6275

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2026-01-21: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 47 - 0.

Last Updated

2026-06-25T08:08:16Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The "China AI Power Report Act" (H.R. 6275) aims to enhance U.S. national security by requiring detailed, annual assessments of China's advanced artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, particularly in supply chains for AI systems. This information would help Congress oversee and update export controls on AI technologies to counter evolving threats from China and maintain U.S. strategic advantages.

Key Provisions

• Sense of Congress: Emphasizes that export controls on AI technologies must be flexible and updated regularly to address China's rapid advancements, methods of evasion (like smuggling or workarounds), and national security risks. Congress needs ongoing updates on China's AI progress to adjust laws as needed.

• Annual Reporting Requirement: The Secretary of Commerce must submit a report to specific congressional committees (House Foreign Affairs and Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) within 180 days of enactment, and annually for three years thereafter. The report covers China's advanced AI capabilities, including supply chains, in consultation with other U.S. agency heads (e.g., State, Defense, Energy, National Intelligence Director, and White House science advisor).

• Report Components: The report must include detailed assessments of:
• AI Chips and Designers (e.g., Huawei, Cambricon): Technical specs like processing power, memory, efficiency, production volumes, software ecosystems, and international use.
• Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities (e.g., SMIC for logic chips; ChangXin, Yangtze for memory): Production capacity, yields (success rate in manufacturing), equipment origins, collaborations (legal or illegal), indigenization efforts (making foreign tech domestic), market share, and trends over five years.
• Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment (e.g., NAURA, KINGSEMI): Production volumes, specs for tools like lithography (patterning chips) and etching (removing material), foreign components, collaborations, and trends.
• Electronic Design Automation (EDA) Software (e.g., Empyrean, Primarius): Capabilities for chip design, compatibility with advanced tech, market share, indigenization, gaps vs. global leaders, and trends.
• Advanced AI Models (from Chinese labs, including military-affiliated): Parameters, training compute (processing power used), performance benchmarks, cyber/biological risks, usage in sectors like military, surveillance, government, and infrastructure; diffusion abroad; alignment with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) goals; and global market share.
• Emerging AI Research: Publications, patents, funding, novel algorithms/hardware (e.g., reinforcement learning, quantum computing), researcher scale, impacts on national security, and IP theft methods (e.g., copying models without permission).
• Funding and Capital Flows: Total Chinese government investments, subsidies (e.g., for energy/compute), foreign investments by source, and recipients.
• Computational Capacity: Top entities' hardware (e.g., chips/servers), sourcing countries, datacenter specs.
• Humanoid Robots (e.g., Unitree, Fourier): Production, costs, components (e.g., chips, sensors), autonomy levels, deployments (military, manufacturing), international diffusion, and vulnerabilities like cybersecurity risks.
• AI-Powered Applications: Models used, deployment methods, data usage (e.g., for surveillance or training), risks to U.S. security/privacy.
• Regulatory Framework in China: Explicit/implicit restrictions (e.g., censorship, data limits), impacts on innovation, CCP oversight efforts, safety measures, and development goals.
• Global Standards Diplomacy: Forums where China influences AI standards, adoptions abroad, procurement effects, and U.S. counter-opportunities.
• Remote Access and Diversions: Chinese access to foreign compute resources (e.g., via cloud) bypassing controls; diverted U.S.-controlled chips (e.g., GPUs), quantities, and enabled compute power.
• Effectiveness of U.S. Export Controls: Loopholes, recommendations for improvements aligned with U.S. security/foreign policy.

• Prioritization and Context: Focus on supply chain items critical to advanced AI (e.g., chips enabling top models). Include comparisons to U.S. and ally capabilities. Consult experts from government, industry, academia, and labs.

• Form and Unclassified Elements: Submitted unclassified, with optional classified annex. Must publicly disclose Chinese AI chip production numbers (past and projected), foundry details, and international diffusion of AI tech (e.g., chips, models, robots).

• Definitions: Clarifies "Secretary" (Commerce) and "covered agency heads" (listed officials).

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill introduces a new, mandatory reporting mechanism not previously required by law, focusing specifically on China's AI ecosystem. It builds on existing export control authorities (e.g., under the Export Administration Regulations) by mandating data to inform updates, but does not directly amend them. The three-year sunset clause limits its duration unless extended.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Department of Commerce (coordinating reports) and other agencies (providing input), potentially leading to more informed policy-making and stricter export controls. Could enhance inter-agency coordination on AI threats.
• Citizens: Indirect effects through bolstered national security measures, such as reduced risks from Chinese AI in surveillance or cyber tools, but no direct benefits or burdens on individuals.
• International Relations: May strain U.S.-China ties by spotlighting sensitive tech advancements and diversions, signaling U.S. intent to curb China's AI rise. Could strengthen alliances with partners (e.g., via shared comparisons) and influence global AI standards to favor U.S. interests.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Government: Congress (for oversight), Department of Commerce (lead reporter), and agencies like Defense and State (consultation and enforcement).
• U.S. Industry: Semiconductor/AI firms (e.g., chip designers, software providers) impacted by potential export control updates; benefits from competitive intelligence.
• China and Chinese Entities: AI/semiconductor companies (e.g., Huawei, SMIC), labs, and government (subject to scrutiny, possible indigenization pressures).
• International Actors: Ally nations (e.g., for comparisons and standards cooperation); global firms supplying tech to China (affected by diversions assessments).
• Researchers and Academia: U.S./Chinese institutions (monitored for collaborations, IP theft).

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces executive branch reporting duties under national security laws (e.g., Arms Export Control Act parallels), with recommendations potentially leading to administrative rule changes. Unclassified requirements promote transparency while allowing classified handling of sensitive data.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's oversight role (Article I) over foreign commerce and national defense; no apparent conflicts with free speech or due process.
• Political: Signals bipartisan concern over U.S.-China AI competition (introduced by cross-party sponsors), potentially fueling debates on tech decoupling. Could politically pressure China on issues like Uyghur surveillance, but focuses on factual assessments rather than sanctions. The limited three-year scope allows for evaluation without long-term commitment.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large]

Cosponsors (7)

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7], Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4], Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6], Rep. Tran, Derek [D-CA-45], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17], Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32], Rep. Lee, Susie [D-NV-3]

Recent Actions

• 2026-01-21: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 47 - 0.
• 2026-01-21: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
• 2025-11-21: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-11-21: Introduced in House
• 2025-11-21: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• China AI Power Report Act — issued 2025-11-21 — PDF (28 pages)