Chip EQUIP Act
- Bill Number
- H.R. 6207
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- Foreign Trade and International Finance
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-11-20: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- Last Updated
- 2026-05-22T08:07:50Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The Chip Equipment Quality, Usefulness, and Integrity Protection Act of 2025 (Chip EQUIP Act) aims to restrict the use of federal funds for purchasing certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced by foreign entities of concern (FEOCs)—typically countries or companies posing national security risks, like those in China—or their subsidiaries. It seeks to protect U.S. supply chains, enhance national security, and promote domestic or allied production of critical technology.
Key Provisions
- Definitions Added:
- Completed, fully assembled semiconductor manufacturing equipment: Refers to equipment that is fully put together with all necessary parts, ready for immediate use, installation, or direct purchase.
- Ineligible semiconductor manufacturing equipment: Fully assembled equipment (not just parts or components) made, assembled, or refurbished by an FEOC or its subsidiary, used in semiconductor fabrication (making chips), assembly, testing, packaging, production, or research. Examples include:
- Deposition equipment (for layering materials on chips).
- Etching equipment (for removing material from chips).
- Lithography equipment (for patterning circuits on chips).
- Inspection, measuring, and test equipment.
- Wafer slicing/dicing equipment (for cutting silicon into chips).
- Wire bonders, ion implantation equipment, chemical mechanical polishing tools, diffusion/oxidation furnaces, thermal processing equipment, and automated material handling systems.
- Prohibitions on Federal Funds:
- Recipients of federal financial assistance under the CHIPS and Science Act (sections 9902 and 9906 of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act) cannot use these funds to procure, install, or operate ineligible equipment for 10 years from the agreement date.
- These restrictions must be included in all relevant federal agreements.
- Waiver Options:
- Waivers can be granted by the Secretary of Commerce if:
- The equipment is unavailable in sufficient quantity or quality from the U.S. or allied/partner countries to meet production needs.
- The equipment was originally made by a non-FEOC entity but only refurbished by an FEOC.
- Its use complies with U.S. Export Administration Regulations (rules governing exports for national security) and the Secretary determines it serves U.S. national security interests, after consulting the Director of National Intelligence or Secretary of Defense.
- Waivers do not override existing FEOC restrictions under section 9907 of the law.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
- Amends the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (part of the CHIPS and Science Act) by:
- Adding two new definitions to section 9901 to clarify what counts as "ineligible" equipment, focusing on fully assembled items rather than individual parts.
- Inserting a new subsection (f) into section 9909, which introduces funding prohibitions and waiver processes not previously specified for semiconductor equipment from FEOCs. (This shifts the prior subsection (f) to (g).)
- Builds on existing CHIPS Act incentives for domestic semiconductor production by adding safeguards against reliance on risky foreign suppliers.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: The Department of Commerce will need to enforce these rules in funding agreements, monitor compliance, and handle waiver requests, potentially increasing administrative workload. It supports broader U.S. efforts to secure technology supply chains.
- Citizens and Industry: U.S. semiconductor companies receiving federal funds (e.g., for new factories) may face higher costs or delays if domestic/allied alternatives are limited, but it could boost long-term job creation and innovation in the U.S. tech sector. Consumers might see indirect effects through stabilized chip prices and availability.
- International Relations: Strengthens U.S. alliances by prioritizing equipment from partner countries (e.g., Japan, Netherlands, South Korea) while restricting trade with FEOCs, potentially escalating tensions with China and affecting global semiconductor markets.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturers and Recipients of Federal Funds: Companies like Intel, TSMC (U.S. operations), or GlobalFoundries that receive CHIPS Act grants must comply, possibly shifting suppliers.
- Federal Government: Primarily the Department of Commerce, along with input from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Defense.
- Foreign Entities: FEOCs and subsidiaries (e.g., Chinese firms like SMIC or equipment makers) face reduced U.S. market access; allied suppliers (e.g., ASML in the Netherlands) may benefit.
- Researchers and Tech Sector: Universities and R&D facilities using federal funds for semiconductor work could be impacted by equipment restrictions.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Reinforces executive authority over national security via waivers and export controls, aligning with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Export Control Reform Act. It clarifies "foreign entity of concern" applications without altering core definitions, reducing ambiguity in enforcement.
- Constitutional: Supports Congress's powers under Article I to regulate commerce and fund national defense, promoting supply chain security as a legitimate government interest without direct First Amendment or due process issues.
- Political: Advances bipartisan U.S. policy on countering China's tech dominance (introduced by a mix of Democrats and Republicans), but could spark debates on protectionism versus free trade. May influence future trade negotiations or WTO challenges if seen as discriminatory.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Cosponsors (10)
Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23], Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8], Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2], Rep. Landsman, Greg [D-OH-1], Rep. Houchin, Erin [R-IN-9], Rep. Weber, Randy K. Sr. [R-TX-14], Rep. Peters, Scott H. [D-CA-50], Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1], Rep. Fedorchak, Julie [R-ND-At Large], Rep. Zinke, Ryan K. [R-MT-1]
Recent Actions
- 2025-11-20: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2025-11-20: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
- 2025-11-20: Introduced in House
- 2025-11-20: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- Chip Equipment Quality, Usefulness, and Integrity Protection Act of 2025 — issued 2025-11-20 — PDF (5 pages)