STRIDE Act

Bill Number

H.R. 6058

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2026-04-22: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

Last Updated

2026-06-04T14:02:21Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The STRIDE Act aims to strengthen the global semiconductor supply chain by promoting multilateral coordination among the United States and its allies to protect critical semiconductor technologies from acquisition by adversaries, particularly the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It seeks to safeguard U.S. national security, economic competitiveness, and technological leadership by preventing the misuse of U.S.-origin technology in military modernization or human rights abuses.

Key Provisions

• Sense of Congress: Declares the semiconductor supply chain vital for U.S. and allied security; highlights CCP strategies like non-market practices, export violations, espionage, and military-civil fusion as threats; emphasizes the need for allied coordination to counter these risks and the effectiveness of U.S. unilateral export controls, such as the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR, a regulation that extends U.S. export controls to products made abroad using U.S. technology).
• Statement of Policy: Outlines U.S. goals to maintain leadership in semiconductor research, design, manufacturing, and materials; prevent adversaries from controlling key supply chain points; coordinate protections with allies; block U.S. technology from aiding CCP military or dominance efforts; and build secure supply chains among partners.
• Multilateral Coordination:
• The Secretary of State must work with countries strong in semiconductor research, design, manufacturing, materials, equipment, or components to develop joint protections against transfers to adversaries (defined as "countries of concern," such as China under existing law).
• Objectives include aligning export controls on equipment (e.g., lithography systems for chip patterning), restricting design tools and intellectual property transfers, harmonizing controls on materials (e.g., photoresists for chip coating), creating joint enforcement to stop third-country circumvention, sharing risk information, and building trusted supplier networks.
• Consequences for Non-Cooperation: The Secretary of State, with the Secretary of Commerce, assesses allies' compliance. If measures are insufficient, the U.S. explains deficiencies, requests the Export Advisory Review Board (an interagency group advising on exports) to create an action plan within 21 days, notifies Congress within 30 days, and recommends expanding FDPR restrictions, adding entities to the Entity List (a Commerce Department list restricting exports to risky foreign parties), or other steps to prevent "backfilling" (replacing restricted U.S. tech with foreign alternatives).
• Reporting Requirements: Every 90 days, the Secretary of State submits reports to congressional committees (House Foreign Affairs; Senate Foreign Relations and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) on diplomatic progress, coordination achievements, non-cooperation findings, and effectiveness in blocking transfers. Reports are unclassified but may include classified annexes.
• Definitions: Clarifies terms like "semiconductor technology" (broadly covering chips, equipment, software, materials, and related services) and references existing laws for "countries of concern" and the Entity List.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill builds on current U.S. export control laws (e.g., under the Export Control Reform Act and Commerce Department regulations) by mandating new multilateral diplomacy and enforcement mechanisms. It introduces formal assessments and penalties for non-cooperating allies, such as targeted FDPR expansions and Entity List additions, which go beyond unilateral U.S. actions. It also requires regular congressional reporting, enhancing oversight without altering core export statutes but amplifying their international application.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Departments of State and Commerce in diplomacy, assessments, and board convenings; promotes interagency collaboration via the Export Advisory Review Board.
• Citizens and Industry: U.S. semiconductor firms may face stricter global compliance but benefit from secure supply chains and reduced competition from adversaries; citizens gain indirect protection for national security and economic stability through resilient tech access.
• International Relations: Strengthens ties with allies (e.g., in Europe, Asia) via coordinated controls, potentially pressuring non-cooperators; may heighten tensions with countries of concern like China by limiting their tech access, risking trade disputes or retaliatory measures.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Government: Departments of State and Commerce; congressional committees on foreign affairs and banking.
• Allied and Partner Nations: Countries with semiconductor expertise (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, Netherlands, Japan) involved in coordination.
• Semiconductor Industry: U.S. and allied companies in design, manufacturing, and equipment (e.g., Intel, ASML); affected by export alignments and trusted networks.
• Adversaries: Entities in countries of concern (e.g., Chinese firms or institutions) facing restricted access to technologies.
• Global Supply Chain Participants: Third-country producers and suppliers potentially subject to FDPR or Entity List expansions for non-cooperation.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces executive authority in export controls under existing statutes (e.g., Arms Export Control Act) while adding procedural safeguards like congressional notifications, ensuring checks on foreign policy actions without infringing on presidential powers.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's Article I role in regulating commerce and foreign affairs; promotes separation of powers through required reports and board consultations.
• Political: Signals bipartisan concern over China threats (introduced by Republicans but broadly applicable); could influence U.S. trade policy by prioritizing security over free trade, potentially sparking debates on economic costs versus strategic gains; enhances U.S. leverage in alliances like the Quad or Chip 4 without new treaties.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Cosponsors (4)

Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large], Rep. Crenshaw, Dan [R-TX-2], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17], Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]

Recent Actions

• 2026-04-22: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.
• 2026-04-22: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
• 2025-11-17: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-11-17: Introduced in House
• 2025-11-17: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Semiconductor Technology Resilience, Integrity, and Defense Enhancement Act — issued 2025-11-17 — PDF (10 pages)