DISRUPT Act

Bill Number: H.R. 5912
Origin Chamber: House
Congress: 119th Congress, Session 1
Policy Area: International Affairs
Status: Introduced
Latest Action: 2025-11-04: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Last Updated: 2026-04-06T18:12:56Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The DISRUPT Act (H.R. 5912) aims to address growing cooperation among four key U.S. adversaries—the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)—by requiring the executive branch to develop a comprehensive, government-wide strategy. This strategy focuses on disrupting their bilateral and multilateral ties, particularly in military, economic, and diplomatic areas, to reduce threats to U.S. national security and global interests.

Key Provisions

Findings: The bill outlines detailed reasons why these four nations are U.S. adversaries, citing their status under existing laws (e.g., as "foreign adversaries" or "countries of concern" in defense and intelligence statutes). It highlights their deepening cooperation, including bilateral treaties, arms transfers (e.g., Iranian drones to Russia, North Korean missiles to Russia), dual-use technology sharing, joint military exercises, disinformation efforts, and evasion of U.S. sanctions. This alignment is described as enabling faster military modernization, challenging U.S. isolation strategies, and increasing risks of multi-front conflicts.

Statement of Policy: U.S. policy is to actively disrupt dangerous aspects of this cooperation using tools like sanctions, export controls, public exposure, and ally coordination; limit the group's global expansion; and prepare for potential simultaneous conflicts with these adversaries across regions like the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

Task Forces on Adversary Alignment: Within 60 days of enactment, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce must each create a task force led by a designated point of contact. These groups will include experts on each adversary, representatives from core agency functions, and personnel with high-level security clearances. By 180 days, each task force must submit a report to their agency head and Congress assessing impacts on agency operations and recommending organizational changes. Task force heads must meet quarterly to share insights.

Report on Cooperation and Risks: Within 60 days, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), with input from relevant agencies, must submit a classified report to the President, Cabinet officials, and Congress. It covers the current and projected (5-year) nature of cooperation across diplomatic, military, economic, and informational domains; benefits to each adversary; risks to U.S. operations (e.g., technology transfers eroding U.S. military edges, challenges to sanctions via alternative payment systems, intelligence threats, and escalation risks in conflicts); and vulnerabilities in adversary relationships that the U.S. could exploit to divide them.

Report on Strategic Approach: Within 180 days, the Secretaries of State and Defense, consulting Treasury, Commerce, and DNI, must submit a classified report to Congress detailing a two-year plan. Key elements include:
Methods to disrupt cooperation, such as targeting defense industry links.
Timelines for engaging allies on risks, securing their support, and addressing their vulnerabilities.
Plans to strengthen U.S. economic tools (e.g., improving sanctions enforcement).
Deterrence enhancements in priority regions, including boosting munitions stockpiles, ally co-production of weapons, and Foreign Military Financing for partner defense industries.
Digitizing Defense Department war-planning tools within one year for better adaptability.
Assessing U.S. gaps in multi-adversary scenarios and plans to mitigate them with allies.

Definitions: Specifies "appropriate committees of Congress" (e.g., Armed Services, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs in both chambers).

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill introduces new mandates not previously required by law, building on existing frameworks like National Defense Authorization Acts that designate these countries as adversaries. It adds:

Dedicated interagency task forces within four key departments to monitor and respond to "adversary alignment."
Two new classified reports (one from DNI, one from State/Defense) focused specifically on this group's cooperation, which can incorporate but go beyond prior intelligence assessments.
Quarterly interagency meetings and organizational recommendations to integrate adversary cooperation into routine operations.

These changes expand executive branch coordination without altering core sanctions or export control laws, but they emphasize proactive disruption and preparation for multi-theater threats.

Potential Impacts

Government Agencies: Increases workload and resource needs for State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and intelligence agencies through task force creation, report production, and quarterly meetings. Could lead to organizational reforms for better threat assessment, potentially improving interagency collaboration but straining budgets and personnel.

Citizens: Indirect effects via enhanced national security measures, such as stronger deterrence against conflicts that could involve U.S. forces. No direct impacts on individual rights, but bolstered sanctions and export controls might influence global markets (e.g., energy prices from restricted Iranian oil).

International Relations: May heighten tensions with the four adversaries by publicizing and targeting their cooperation, potentially prompting retaliatory actions like further sanctions evasion or military posturing. Positively, it could strengthen U.S. alliances by educating partners on risks, fostering joint munitions production, and addressing ally vulnerabilities, thus enhancing collective deterrence in regions like Europe (Ukraine support) and the Indo-Pacific (Taiwan).

Main Stakeholders Affected

U.S. Government Entities: Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and congressional committees overseeing foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, and finance.
U.S. Allies and Partners: Countries like Israel, Taiwan, Ukraine, and NATO/EU members, who may receive support for defense production and vulnerability assessments to counter shared threats.
Adversary Nations: PRC, Russia, Iran, and DPRK, whose bilateral/multilateral ties (e.g., arms deals, BRICS expansion) face U.S. disruption efforts.
International Organizations: Bodies like the UN Security Council, where U.S. influence could be bolstered or challenged by adversary vetoes/abstentions.
Broader Global Actors: Multilateral groups (e.g., BRICS) and global markets affected by sanctions enforcement and alternative payment systems.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

Legal: Reinforces executive authority in foreign policy and national security under Article II of the Constitution, while mandating congressional oversight through reports to specified committees. Reports are classified to protect sensitive intelligence, but recommendations could influence future laws (e.g., sanctions expansions). No direct challenges to civil liberties, as focus is on foreign threats.

Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's war powers and foreign commerce regulation (Article I), promoting a "whole-of-government" approach without infringing on separation of powers—executive implements, Congress directs via legislation.

Political: Signals bipartisan concern (introduced by Reps. Krishnamoorthi and Moylan) over escalating global threats, potentially unifying U.S. policy across administrations. Could politicize intelligence assessments if seen as overly adversarial, but emphasizes ally engagement to avoid isolationism. Risks escalating diplomatic frictions, yet aims to mitigate broader conflict probabilities through preparation.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]

Cosponsors (1)

Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large]

Recent Actions

2025-11-04: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-11-04: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-11-04: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-11-04: Introduced in House
2025-11-04: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

Defending International Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act — issued 2025-11-04 — PDF (19 pages)