RESTRAIN Act

Bill Number

H.R. 5894

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Armed Forces and National Security

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-11-19: Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4779-4780)

Last Updated

2026-06-30T08:06:20Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The RESTRAIN Act (H.R. 5894) aims to permanently prohibit the United States from conducting explosive nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosions, while reinforcing arms control efforts by limiting funding for such activities. It seeks to extend and strengthen existing restrictions on nuclear testing to promote global non-proliferation.

Key Provisions

• Prohibition on Testing: Amends the Atomic Energy Defense Act to ban all explosive nuclear weapons tests or nuclear explosions conducted by the U.S. government.
• Funding Restrictions: Prohibits the use of any federal funds authorized for fiscal year 2026 or subsequent years to conduct explosive nuclear tests or explosions.
• Exception for Subcritical Tests: Allows non-explosive "subcritical nuclear tests," defined as experiments with fissile materials (nuclear fuel components) that cannot sustain a chain reaction leading to an explosion. This preserves research capabilities without violating the ban.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Replaces the previous temporary or conditional restrictions in Section 4210(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (enacted in 2002) with a broad, ongoing prohibition on explosive testing.
• Introduces new funding limitations and a clear definition for subcritical tests, which were not explicitly detailed before, ensuring the ban applies indefinitely without annual renewals.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: The Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DoD), which oversee nuclear programs, would face restrictions on testing activities, potentially shifting focus to computer simulations, subcritical experiments, and stockpile maintenance without live explosions. This could reduce operational costs but limit certain verification methods for nuclear reliability.
• Citizens: U.S. citizens, particularly those in communities near testing sites (e.g., Nevada), may benefit from reduced environmental and health risks associated with nuclear explosions, such as radiation exposure.
• International Relations: Strengthens U.S. commitments under treaties like the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), potentially improving diplomatic ties with non-nuclear states and allies by signaling de-escalation. However, it could complicate relations with nuclear-armed adversaries if perceived as unilateral disarmament without reciprocity.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Government Entities: DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and DoD, responsible for nuclear stewardship.
• Scientific and Research Community: Nuclear physicists and engineers involved in weapons maintenance, who may need to adapt to non-explosive testing methods.
• Arms Control Advocates and NGOs: Groups like the Arms Control Association, which support the ban for non-proliferation goals.
• International Actors: Nuclear non-proliferation organizations (e.g., IAEA) and countries party to the CTBT, benefiting from U.S. leadership in test suspension.
• Nuclear-Armed Nations: Such as Russia and China, whose testing policies could be indirectly influenced through diplomatic pressure.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces congressional authority under the Atomic Energy Act framework by amending defense legislation, with enforceable funding prohibitions that could lead to legal challenges if agencies attempt workarounds (e.g., via international collaborations).
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's power of the purse (Article I, Section 9) to control appropriations and its role in regulating foreign affairs and defense (Article I, Section 8), without infringing on executive treaty powers.
• Political: Supports bipartisan non-proliferation goals but may spark debate over national security, as critics could argue it hampers deterrence against evolving threats; proponents view it as a step toward global stability, potentially aiding Senate ratification of the CTBT.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

Cosponsors (28)

Rep. Garamendi, John [D-CA-8], Rep. McGovern, James P. [D-MA-2], Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36], Rep. Doggett, Lloyd [D-TX-37], Rep. Swalwell, Eric [D-CA-14], Rep. Tokuda, Jill N. [D-HI-2], Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12], Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large], Rep. Beyer, Donald S. [D-VA-8], Rep. Garcia, Sylvia R. [D-TX-29], Rep. Pappas, Chris [D-NH-1], Rep. Khanna, Ro [D-CA-17], Rep. Courtney, Joe [D-CT-2], Rep. Quigley, Mike [D-IL-5], Rep. Foster, Bill [D-IL-11], Rep. Lofgren, Zoe [D-CA-18], Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7], Rep. Omar, Ilhan [D-MN-5], Rep. Moulton, Seth [D-MA-6], Rep. Thompson, Mike [D-CA-4], Rep. Hoyle, Val T. [D-OR-4], Rep. Cisneros, Gilbert Ray [D-CA-31], Rep. Morelle, Joseph D. [D-NY-25], Rep. McBride, Sarah [D-DE-At Large], Rep. Levin, Mike [D-CA-49], Rep. Smith, Adam [D-WA-9], Rep. Brownley, Julia [D-CA-26], Rep. DeSaulnier, Mark [D-CA-10]

Recent Actions

• 2025-11-19: Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4779-4780)
• 2025-10-31: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.
• 2025-10-31: Introduced in House
• 2025-10-31: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Renewing Efforts to Suspend Testing and Reinforce Arms-control Initiatives Now Act — issued 2025-10-31 — PDF (3 pages)