No Advanced Chips for the CCP Act of 2025.
- Bill Number
- H.R. 5022
- Origin Chamber
- House
- Congress
- 119th Congress, Session 1
- Policy Area
- International Affairs
- Status
- Introduced
- Latest Action
- 2025-08-22: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- Last Updated
- 2025-10-22T08:05:22Z
AI-Generated Summary
Purpose
The "No Advanced Chips for the CCP Act of 2025" aims to restrict the export of high-performance semiconductors used in artificial intelligence (AI) to the People's Republic of China (PRC), including its controlled entities. It seeks to protect U.S. national security, technological leadership, and human rights by mandating both executive branch review and explicit congressional approval for such exports.
Key Provisions
- Export Restrictions: No individual, company, or entity ("person") may export, reexport, or transfer an "advanced AI semiconductor" to the PRC without approval from the Secretary of Commerce and a joint resolution passed by Congress.
- Executive Review Process:
- The Secretary of Commerce must conduct an interagency review with the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State, plus the Director of National Intelligence.
- Review factors include: risks to U.S. national security and technological edge; potential for Chinese military use; risks of human rights abuses in China; availability of similar technology elsewhere; and economic effects on U.S. businesses and workers.
- Approval is granted only if the export aligns with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
- Congressional Oversight:
- Within 30 days of executive approval, the Secretary of Commerce submits a detailed report to Congress on the semiconductor, recipient, intended use, review analysis, and approval rationale.
- Exports can only proceed after Congress enacts a specific joint resolution approving the action.
- Exceptions:
- Humanitarian purposes (as determined by Commerce).
- Needs of U.S. diplomatic or consular operations in the PRC.
- Returns of pre-existing exports for repair or replacement.
- Definitions:
- Advanced AI semiconductor: Chips exceeding thresholds like 2,400 total processing performance, 1.6 performance density, over 4,100 GB/s DRAM bandwidth, over 1,100 GB/s interconnect bandwidth, or a combined bandwidth sum over 5,100 GB/s (technical specs for high-end AI hardware).
- People's Republic of China: Includes its territory (Hong Kong and Macau) and any entities owned, controlled, or acting for its government or the Chinese Communist Party.
- Person: Broadly covers individuals, corporations, partnerships, or other legal entities worldwide.
- Sunset Clause: The law expires three years after enactment.
Significant Changes to Existing Law
This bill builds on current U.S. export control laws (e.g., those under the Export Administration Regulations) by adding a mandatory congressional approval layer. Previously, the executive branch (primarily Commerce) handled such decisions unilaterally after reviews; now, even approved exports require a joint resolution, shifting some authority from the president to Congress on sensitive AI technology transfers to China.
Potential Impacts
- Government Agencies: Increases workload for the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, and intelligence community due to required interagency reviews and reporting. It may slow export processes and heighten inter-branch coordination.
- Citizens and Businesses: U.S. semiconductor firms could face revenue losses or delays in sales to China, potentially affecting jobs and innovation, but it might protect domestic tech leadership. Everyday citizens are indirectly impacted through broader economic ties and supply chain effects.
- International Relations: Could strain U.S.-China trade and tech cooperation, escalating tensions over technology competition. It signals stronger U.S. resolve against PRC military or rights abuses enabled by AI, possibly influencing allies to adopt similar restrictions.
Main Stakeholders Affected
- U.S. Semiconductor Companies: Major producers (e.g., Nvidia, Intel) exporting AI chips, who must navigate stricter approvals.
- Chinese Entities: Government, military, and private firms in the PRC seeking advanced tech, facing potential supply barriers.
- U.S. Government and Congress: Executive agencies gain review input but lose unilateral decision-making; lawmakers exercise direct veto power over exports.
- Intelligence and Defense Communities: Involved in assessments, with heightened focus on security risks.
- Global Tech Supply Chain Participants: Allies or neutral countries providing alternatives, and international firms affected by U.S. extraterritorial reach.
Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications
- Legal: Reinforces export controls under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act but introduces enforceable exceptions to avoid overly broad restrictions. The technical definitions provide clear, measurable criteria to reduce ambiguity in enforcement.
- Constitutional: Enhances Congress's role in foreign affairs (under Article I's commerce and war powers), potentially challenging executive authority in national security (separation of powers debate), though it aligns with precedents like the War Powers Resolution.
- Political: Promotes bipartisan scrutiny of China policy (introduced by Reps. Krishnamoorthi, Bera, and Tokuda across party lines), but the three-year sunset allows for future reassessment amid evolving U.S.-China dynamics. It could set a precedent for congressional involvement in emerging tech exports beyond AI.
This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.
Sponsor
Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]
Cosponsors (5)
Rep. Bera, Ami [D-CA-6], Rep. Tokuda, Jill N. [D-HI-2], Rep. Carson, André [D-IN-7], Rep. Moulton, Seth [D-MA-6], Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]
Recent Actions
- 2025-08-22: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- 2025-08-22: Introduced in House
- 2025-08-22: Introduced in House
Bill Versions
- No Advanced Chips for the CCP Act of 2025. — issued 2025-08-22 — PDF (6 pages)