Securing Global Telecommunications Act

Bill Number

H.R. 4506

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-07-17: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Last Updated

2026-03-31T11:19:16Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The Securing Global Telecommunications Act (H.R. 4506) aims to strengthen U.S. leadership in global telecommunications by requiring the development of a strategy to promote secure, trusted infrastructure worldwide. It addresses national security risks from untrusted vendors, particularly those linked to China (e.g., Huawei), and emphasizes cooperation with allies to counter authoritarian influence in international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

Key Provisions

• Sense of Congress (Section 2): Expresses U.S. priorities, including maintaining technological leadership, countering Chinese dominance in telecom (e.g., risks of data theft or internet shutdowns), supporting U.S. companies' competitiveness, engaging developing nations at the ITU, and fostering multilateral partnerships for secure networks.

• Strategy for Securing Global Telecommunications Infrastructure (Section 3):
• Requires the Secretary of State to develop and submit a comprehensive strategy within 90 days of enactment to relevant congressional committees.
• The strategy must be developed in consultation with leaders from the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Commerce Department's Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information.
• Key elements include:
• Mobile networks: Promoting trusted Open RAN (open radio access network) technologies, financing "rip-and-replace" projects (removing and replacing untrusted equipment), multilateral cooperation with developing countries, and partnerships with U.S. private sector firms to challenge Chinese market leaders.
• Data centers: Using financing to encourage trusted providers and multilateral efforts for secure deployments in emerging economies.
• 6G and future technologies: Enhancing cooperation with allies for U.S./allied leadership and gaining support from developing countries for trusted options.
• Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons: Collaborating with trusted companies to ensure rapid internet access in emergencies.

• Report on Malign Influence at the ITU (Section 4):
• Requires a report within 90 days from the Secretary of State on Russian and Chinese efforts to expand ITU's role in internet governance, advance authoritarian interests, and undermine fair processes.
• Covers tactics like leveraging private companies (e.g., Huawei's influence on developing countries for ITU elections and standards), pressuring members, and using nationals in ITU roles to favor their governments.
• The report must be unclassified, with an optional classified annex.

• Report on Multilateral Coordination (Section 5):
• Requires a joint report within 90 days from the Secretary of State and other agencies on opportunities to collaborate with allies and partners.
• Focuses on joint financing for trusted vendors, integrating secure telecom into development finance, and diplomatic efforts to highlight risks of untrusted providers.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill introduces new mandates without directly amending prior laws. It creates novel requirements for a formal U.S. strategy and two specific reports, building on existing authorities (e.g., State Department's diplomatic tools and agencies' financing roles) but formalizing a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to global telecom security. No explicit repeals or modifications to current statutes are included.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases workload for the State Department (leading strategy and reports) and coordinating agencies (EXIM, DFC, USAID, TDA, FCC, Commerce), potentially requiring new resources for diplomacy, financing, and technical expertise. This could streamline interagency efforts but strain budgets if not funded separately.

• Citizens: Indirect benefits through enhanced U.S. national security, as secure global networks reduce risks of foreign espionage or disruptions affecting U.S. data and communications. No direct impacts on domestic citizens or rights.

• International Relations: Strengthens alliances by promoting joint initiatives with like-minded countries, while pressuring adversaries (China, Russia) through exposure of ITU influence tactics. May improve U.S. leverage in developing nations by offering financing alternatives to Chinese options, potentially shifting global market dynamics toward trusted vendors.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Government Entities: State Department, EXIM, DFC, USAID, TDA, FCC, and Commerce Department—directly tasked with strategy development, consultations, and reports.
• U.S. Private Sector: Telecom companies (e.g., trusted vendors in Open RAN, 6G, satellites) that could gain market access and financing support to compete globally.
• Allies and Partners: Like-minded nations and international organizations (e.g., ITU members) benefiting from multilateral cooperation on secure infrastructure.
• Developing and Emerging Economies: Countries receiving incentives for trusted tech, potentially reducing reliance on Chinese providers but facing pressure in ITU decisions.
• Adversarial Actors: Chinese (e.g., Huawei, CCP-linked firms) and Russian entities, whose global influence and market share could be challenged.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Establishes clear deadlines (90 days) and reporting requirements, enforceable through congressional oversight, but lacks specified enforcement mechanisms or penalties. Relies on existing executive authorities, avoiding conflicts with separation of powers.
• Constitutional: No apparent issues; aligns with Congress's powers over foreign affairs and commerce. Emphasizes diplomatic and economic tools over coercive measures.
• Political: Highlights U.S.-China tech rivalry and authoritarian threats, potentially influencing ITU dynamics and global standards. Promotes multilateralism, which could build bipartisan support but risk tensions if seen as confrontational toward developing nations. The unclassified report format ensures transparency while allowing classified details for sensitive intelligence.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

Cosponsors (2)

Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40], Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

Recent Actions

• 2025-07-17: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-07-17: Introduced in House
• 2025-07-17: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Securing Global Telecommunications Act — issued 2025-07-17 — PDF (8 pages)