Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act

Bill Number

H.R. 4240

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-06-27: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Last Updated

2025-11-18T09:05:46Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act aims to protect U.S. national security by addressing risks from telecommunications equipment and services produced by entities tied to adversarial nations, such as China. It promotes the use of "trusted" (secure and non-risky) telecom options in U.S. allies, partners, and U.S. embassies, while requiring reports on "untrusted" equipment (like that from Huawei or ZTE) to highlight vulnerabilities and support safer alternatives.

Key Provisions

• Sense of Congress (Section 2): Expresses that U.S. security depends on secure telecom in allies; views mobile and internet services as tools for foreign influence; deems Huawei and ZTE (and affiliates) untrusted due to Chinese government ties; and supports global adoption of trusted telecom for U.S. economic and security interests.

• Report on Untrusted Telecom in Allies (Section 3): Requires the Secretary of State, with input from the Commerce Department's Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, to submit a report within 180 days of enactment (and annually for two more years) to key congressional committees. The report covers U.S. allies with collective defense agreements (e.g., NATO members) and details:
• Presence of untrusted equipment in 5G networks.
• If present: Which mobile carriers use it, its location in the network (core for critical functions or periphery for less sensitive parts), and any removal ("rip and replace") plans.
• Plans for untrusted equipment in future technologies like Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN, a more flexible network architecture) or 6G.

• Report on Covered Telecom in U.S. Embassies (Section 4): Notes findings from a government audit showing Chinese or Russian suppliers in State Department telecom. Requires a report within 180 days from the Secretary of State (with other agency input) to congressional foreign affairs committees, assessing:
• Implementation of a 2019 law (Section 889 of the National Defense Authorization Act) banning untrusted equipment in embassies, including which embassies comply, delays (e.g., supply chain visibility or replacement costs), waivers granted (with justifications), and phase-out plans.
• Extent of servicing of embassy staff devices by Huawei, ZTE, or other Chinese firms, and risks of Chinese intelligence access to data.
• Other efforts to secure embassy communications.
• The report is unclassified but may include a classified addendum.

• Supporting Trusted Telecom (Section 5): Directs the Secretary of State, with Commerce input, to select infrastructure projects that boost U.S. security and meet criteria. Provides:
• Diplomatic and political support to overcome project barriers.
• Early-stage assistance from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (e.g., feasibility studies).

• Definitions (Section 6): Defines "covered" or "untrusted" telecom as risky equipment/services per the 2019 Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act (e.g., from entities posing security threats). "Trusted" means anything not covered.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

This bill introduces new mandatory reporting requirements and support mechanisms, building on prior laws like the 2019 Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act (which defines untrusted equipment) and Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (which bans federal use of such equipment). It expands oversight to international allies and U.S. embassies without altering those laws directly, but requires assessments of their implementation, potentially leading to stricter enforcement or fewer waivers.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: The State and Commerce Departments face added reporting duties and project selection responsibilities, increasing workload and coordination. The Trade and Development Agency may provide more early support for telecom initiatives.
• Citizens: Indirect benefits through enhanced global telecom security, reducing risks of data breaches or foreign influence affecting U.S. communications abroad; no direct impact on domestic citizens.
• International Relations: Could strengthen ties with allies by promoting secure networks, but may create tensions with China (targeted via Huawei/ZTE) through diplomatic pressure and support for alternatives, potentially influencing trade or defense pacts.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Government Entities: State Department (lead on reports and diplomacy), Commerce Department (consultation), congressional committees (Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, Foreign Relations, Commerce/Science/Transportation).
• Allies and Partners: Countries with U.S. defense agreements (e.g., NATO nations, Japan, South Korea), their mobile carriers, and network operators, who may face scrutiny or incentives to remove untrusted equipment.
• Telecom Companies: Untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE (increased restrictions and exposure); trusted providers (e.g., U.S. or allied firms) gain from diplomatic backing and project support.
• Embassy Personnel: U.S. diplomats and staff, through improved device and network security assessments.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Reinforces existing bans on untrusted telecom without new prohibitions, but the reporting could inform future regulations or waivers, ensuring accountability under procurement laws. No direct challenges to supply chain transparency requirements.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's foreign affairs powers (e.g., regulating international commerce and security); no apparent free speech or privacy issues, as it focuses on government and allied networks.
• Political: Signals U.S. commitment to countering Chinese tech influence, potentially bipartisan support for national security, but could escalate U.S.-China rivalry; promotes "trusted" ecosystems, aiding U.S. tech exports while pressuring allies to align.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Moskowitz, Jared [D-FL-23]

Cosponsors (2)

Del. Radewagen, Aumua Amata Coleman [R-AS-At Large], Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6]

Recent Actions

• 2025-06-27: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-06-27: Introduced in House
• 2025-06-27: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act — issued 2025-06-27 — PDF (9 pages)