SECURE American Telecommunications Act

Bill Number

H.R. 3479

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Science, Technology, Communications

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-05-19: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

Last Updated

2025-07-17T11:33:02Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose of the Legislation

The Safeguarding Essential Cables through Undersea Risk Elimination American Telecommunications Act (SECURE American Telecommunications Act) aims to strengthen the licensing process and enhance the security of submarine (undersea) and cross-border terrestrial (land-based) telecommunications cables that connect the United States to other countries. It focuses on preventing risks from foreign adversaries, improving cybersecurity and physical protections, and streamlining federal approvals to support reliable global communications infrastructure.

Key Provisions

• Submarine Cable Licensing (Section 2): Transfers authority for issuing, withholding, or revoking licenses from the President to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Prohibits licenses for cables connecting directly to areas controlled by U.S. foreign adversaries (e.g., specified governments or entities posing national security threats) or using equipment from the FCC's "covered list" of untrusted communications gear. Requires licensees to report cybersecurity incidents within 24 hours to the FCC and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Mandates FCC to establish and periodically review minimum standards for physical security, cybersecurity, and spacing between cables on the seabed. Sets a 540-day deadline for FCC decisions on license applications, with automatic approval if missed.

• Cross-Border Terrestrial Cable Licensing (Section 3): Requires FCC licenses for constructing, operating, or maintaining land-based telecommunications cables crossing U.S. borders. Applies similar security and reporting rules as submarine cables where feasible. Exempts these from separate border-crossing permits under Executive Order 13867 and directs FCC to create a unified application process for licenses and other federal approvals. Applies only to cables built after new regulations are issued (within 180 days of enactment).

• Permit Process and Exemptions (Section 4): Directs the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to issue a nationwide general permit under the Clean Water Act for submarine cable construction, repair, and maintenance, incorporating FCC spacing standards. Prohibits most other federal authorizations (e.g., environmental reviews) except for FCC licenses or specific communications certificates. Maintains a categorical exclusion from full National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews for new submarine cables. Preempts state and local governments from regulating cable placement or landing stations based on environmental impacts if an FCC license is issued.

• Repair Reports (Section 5): Requires anyone repairing damage to submarine or terrestrial cables (or their landing stations) to report details, including known causes, to the FCC within 7 days via its Network Outage Reporting System. FCC must share reports with CISA, the Navy, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Reports can be classified.

• Protection Zone Study (Section 6): Mandates a joint study by the FCC, Army Corps of Engineers, and NOAA on creating U.S. submarine cable protection zones—restricted maritime areas to prevent damage from ships or other activities. The study will analyze environmental, commercial, regulatory factors, costs, benefits, and international examples, with a report due to congressional committees within 540 days.

• Incidents Report (Section 7): Requires the FCC to submit annual unclassified reports (with possible classified annex) to congressional intelligence committees on cybersecurity incidents targeting U.S.-licensed submarine cables, allied countries' cables, or related landing stations, caused by foreign governments or non-state actors.

• International Security Agreement (Section 8): Directs the Secretary of State to negotiate an agreement within 180 days with "covered countries" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) for shared minimum security standards on submarine cables, landing stations, and licensing.

• Penalties for Injury to Submarine Cables (Section 9): Increases criminal penalties under an 1888 law: up to 25 years imprisonment and fines for willful damage to cables (previously a misdemeanor with up to 2 years); up to 1 year and fines for negligent damage (previously up to 3 months).

• International Cable Protection Committee Membership (Section 10): Requires the FCC to join this global group focused on protecting undersea cables within 30 days.

• Definitions (Section 11): Clarifies terms like "cybersecurity risk" (threats including unauthorized access, disruption, or terrorism, excluding minor consumer violations), "federal authorization" (broadly covers permits and approvals), and "terrestrial telecommunications cable" (land-based cables for telecom, including related infrastructure).

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Shifts submarine cable licensing authority from the President to the FCC, modernizing a 1921 law and adding national security prohibitions tied to foreign adversaries and untrusted equipment lists from a 2019 law.
• Introduces new licensing requirements for cross-border terrestrial cables, previously unregulated under telecommunications-specific laws.
• Streamlines approvals by exempting projects from multiple federal, environmental, and state/local rules, while mandating security standards and faster FCC timelines (with "deemed granted" automatic approvals).
• Enhances penalties for cable damage from outdated misdemeanor levels to felony-equivalent terms under modern federal sentencing guidelines.
• Adds mandatory incident reporting, studies, and international coordination not previously required.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases workload for the FCC (e.g., licensing, standards, reports), CISA (incident response), State Department (diplomacy), and others like NOAA and the Army Corps for studies and permits. Could reduce bureaucratic delays, allowing faster infrastructure deployment.
• Citizens: Improves reliability and security of internet and telecom services that depend on these cables (handling ~95% of global data traffic), potentially reducing outage risks from cyberattacks or physical damage. Minimal direct effects on individuals, but could indirectly raise costs for telecom services if companies pass on compliance expenses.
• International Relations: Restricts connections to adversarial nations, strengthening alliances with "covered countries" through shared standards. May strain ties with restricted entities and encourage global norms for cable protection via the International Cable Protection Committee.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators: Must obtain FCC licenses, comply with security standards, and report incidents/repairs; benefits from streamlined permitting but faces higher compliance costs and restrictions on partnerships.
• Government Entities: FCC (primary regulator), CISA (cybersecurity), State Department (foreign policy), Defense Department and intelligence agencies (security consultations), NOAA and Army Corps (environmental and maritime oversight).
• Foreign Governments and Entities: Adversaries face connection bans; allies (e.g., Australia, Canada) gain from cooperative agreements; global shipping and fishing industries may be impacted by potential protection zones.
• Environmental and Local Groups: Limited influence due to preemption of state/local environmental regs, though a general Clean Water Act permit maintains some federal oversight.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Preempts state/local authority and exempts from NEPA and other laws, potentially reducing litigation over environmental impacts but raising questions about federal overreach in interstate commerce (protected under the Commerce Clause). Automatic license approvals after 540 days could challenge administrative discretion.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's authority over foreign affairs and commerce; security prohibitions support national security interests without direct free speech issues, though broad "cybersecurity risk" definitions might invite challenges if applied to non-malicious acts.
• Political: Emphasizes U.S. competition with foreign adversaries in telecom infrastructure, promoting "secure" American leadership. Could accelerate private investment in cables amid geopolitical tensions (e.g., undersea sabotage concerns), but streamlined processes might draw criticism for weakening environmental protections. Bipartisan appeal in national security, with referral to multiple House committees signaling broad jurisdictional interest.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Yakym, Rudy [R-IN-2]

Cosponsors (3)

Rep. McDowell, Addison P. [R-NC-6], Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6], Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

Recent Actions

• 2025-05-19: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-05-19: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-05-19: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-05-19: Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-05-19: Introduced in House
• 2025-05-19: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Safeguarding Essential Cables through Undersea Risk Elimination American Telecommunications Act — issued 2025-05-19 — PDF (16 pages)