To establish a Department of State Domestic Protection Mission relating to unmanned aircraft system and unmanned aircraft.

Bill Number

H.R. 1386

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-02-14: Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.

Last Updated

2025-05-07T16:23:28Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

This bill, H.R. 1386, aims to create a temporary "Domestic Protection Mission" within the Department of State to address threats from unmanned aircraft systems (drones) to high-risk facilities and assets under the department's security responsibilities. It grants specific authorities to detect, disrupt, and neutralize such threats while ensuring coordination with aviation safety regulators and protections for privacy and civil liberties.

Key Provisions

• Authority for Actions: The Secretary of State, along with trained diplomatic security personnel and contractors, can take measures to counter credible drone threats (defined through a risk assessment in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA) to "covered facilities or assets." These include U.S.-based sites like embassies or events tied to diplomatic protection, identified as high-risk for unlawful drone activity.
• Allowed Actions:
• Detect, identify, monitor, and track drones, including intercepting communications used to control them (without prior consent).
• Warn operators using physical, electronic, radio, or electromagnetic methods.
• Disrupt control by interfering with communications or disabling the drone.
• Seize, confiscate, or exercise control over the drone.
• Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the drone if necessary.
• Research and Testing: The department must test equipment for these actions, coordinating with the FAA to avoid interfering with airport operations or national airspace.
• Forfeiture: Seized drones are subject to federal forfeiture laws.
• Regulations and Guidance: The Secretaries of State and Transportation, with input from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), will issue rules to implement the bill, focusing on safe airspace use.
• Coordination Requirements: All actions must be developed and executed in coordination with the FAA to prevent disruptions to air traffic, navigation, or airspace efficiency. Further coordination involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for regulations.
• Privacy Protections: Rules must align with the First Amendment (free speech) and Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable searches) of the U.S. Constitution. Interceptions are limited to what's needed, records kept no longer than 180 days (with exceptions for investigations or security needs), and disclosures restricted to law enforcement, national security, or legal requirements.
• Budget and Reporting: The department must include funding details in annual budget submissions to Congress. Semiannual briefings to congressional committees will cover activities, privacy policies, public notifications, law enforcement engagement, and impacts on drone integration into airspace.
• Assistance and Support: The department can use resources from other federal agencies, private entities, or provide mutual aid in emergencies, on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.
• Duration and Scope: Authorities last 7 years from enactment and apply only to specific, time-limited scenarios at static locations for diplomatic security.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Overrides select federal laws, including aviation safety rules (49 U.S.C. § 46502), computer fraud provisions (18 U.S.C. § 1030), wiretapping restrictions (18 U.S.C. chapters 119 and 206), aircraft sabotage laws (18 U.S.C. § 32 and § 1367), and communications privacy (Communications Act § 705), but only for State Department personnel in drone threat mitigation.
• Introduces new exceptions for intercepting drone control communications without warrants, which were previously prohibited under privacy and surveillance laws.
• Establishes a risk-based assessment process for identifying protected sites, expanding State Department domestic counter-drone powers beyond traditional foreign affairs roles.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Enhances the State Department's ability to protect diplomatic assets domestically, requiring closer collaboration with the FAA, FCC, NTIA, and other agencies for airspace safety. It may strain resources for testing, training, and reporting, with budget transparency to Congress.
• Citizens: Improves security around diplomatic facilities, potentially reducing risks from malicious drones (e.g., surveillance or attacks). However, it could affect lawful drone operators by limiting access near protected sites, with requirements for public notifications to minimize disruptions.
• International Relations: Primarily domestic-focused, but strengthens protection for U.S. diplomatic missions, which could indirectly support foreign policy by safeguarding personnel and events. No direct international impacts noted, though coordination with aviation authorities ensures global airspace standards are maintained.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• Department of State and Diplomatic Security Personnel: Gains new counter-drone authorities and responsibilities for training, operations, and privacy compliance.
• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Transportation Sector: Must coordinate extensively to protect national airspace, influencing drone regulations and safe integration.
• Drone Operators and Aviation Industry: Faces potential restrictions or interceptions near protected sites, balanced by requirements to avoid unnecessary interference with lawful flights.
• Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies: Benefits from shared information and mutual support for security operations.
• Congressional Committees: Receives regular briefings and budget details, including Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Transportation committees.
• Private Contractors and Telecom Entities: Can participate in testing and operations but must meet training and certification standards; NTIA and FCC provide input on communications aspects.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Temporarily expands executive authority for warrantless interceptions and use of force against private property (drones), justified by security needs but limited by privacy safeguards and FAA oversight to prevent overreach. Forfeiture follows established federal procedures, reducing legal challenges.
• Constitutional: Explicitly requires adherence to First and Fourth Amendment protections, addressing potential concerns over surveillance and property rights. The 7-year sunset clause allows Congress to review and renew, promoting accountability.
• Political: Represents a bipartisan push (introduced by Reps. Mills and McCaul) for targeted national security enhancements amid rising drone threats, but could spark debates on federal overreach into domestic airspace and privacy. Semiannual reporting ensures oversight, potentially influencing future aviation and security policies without shifting core authorities between departments.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

Cosponsors (2)

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10], Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Recent Actions

• 2025-02-14: Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
• 2025-02-14: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-02-14: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-02-14: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-02-14: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-02-14: Introduced in House
• 2025-02-14: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• To establish a Department of State Domestic Protection Mission relating to unmanned aircraft system and unmanned aircraft. — issued 2025-02-14 — PDF (16 pages)