Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025

Bill Number

H.R. 1215

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

International Affairs

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-02-11: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Last Updated

2025-05-07T14:11:38Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025 aims to help governments in Western Hemisphere countries (including the U.S., Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean) build more diverse and secure supply chains for semiconductors. This focuses on reducing reliance on single sources for critical materials and manufacturing steps, enhancing economic and national security by creating regional alternatives to global dependencies, such as those in Asia.

Key Provisions

• Definitions:
• Upstream supply chain refers to the extraction, production, or processing of essential minerals for semiconductors, including zinc, gallium, germanium, silicon, lithium, and cobalt.
• Downstream supply chain covers testing, packaging, and advanced facilities for semiconductors.

• Sense of Congress and Policy Statement:
• Congress believes the U.S. benefits economically and for national security by fostering semiconductor ecosystems in the Western Hemisphere to support U.S. investments under the CHIPS and Science Act (a 2022 law funding domestic semiconductor production).
• U.S. policy is to strengthen allies' security through open, competitive semiconductor markets with varied sources and to promote U.S. public and private investments in Latin American infrastructure, tailored to local needs.

• Support for Diversification:
• The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Commerce and other agencies, must prioritize diplomatic efforts to aid Western Hemisphere countries in diversifying supply chains.
• This includes:
• Backing the Organization of American States (OAS) and regional governments in negotiations for cross-border infrastructure, improving regulations, and building transparent markets with diverse energy sources.
• Assisting in diversifying mineral sources/routes and integrating regional semiconductor markets.

• Funding and Implementation via U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC):
• The DFC (a U.S. agency that finances development projects abroad) can support upstream and downstream projects in upper-middle-income or high-income Western Hemisphere countries (as classified by the World Bank).
• Support requires a presidential certification to Congress that it advances U.S. economic or foreign policy interests and either delivers development benefits to the poorest populations or counters strategic competitors (e.g., nations seeking influence over key technologies).

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Waives restrictions in the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018, which generally limits DFC financing in higher-income countries to focus on poorer nations.
• Introduces conditional exceptions allowing DFC support in wealthier Western Hemisphere countries if it serves U.S. interests, such as preventing foreign competitors from gaining leverage in allied nations.
• Defines "appropriate congressional committees" (e.g., Foreign Affairs and Appropriations committees) for oversight, aligning with the BUILD Act.

Potential Impacts

• Government Agencies: Increases coordination among the State Department, Commerce Department, and DFC, potentially expanding their roles in regional diplomacy and financing without new funding mandates.
• Citizens and Industry: U.S. semiconductor firms and workers may gain from more stable, regional supply chains, reducing risks from global disruptions (e.g., shortages). Citizens in Western Hemisphere countries could see job growth in mining, processing, and tech facilities.
• International Relations: Strengthens U.S. ties with Latin American partners by promoting shared infrastructure and countering influence from rivals like China in critical tech sectors. It could foster OAS-led cooperation but requires balancing U.S. interests with regional capacities.

Main Stakeholders

• U.S. Government Agencies: State Department (diplomacy), Commerce Department (trade oversight), DFC (financing), and Congress (certification and oversight).
• Western Hemisphere Governments: Especially in Latin America, benefiting from support for infrastructure and markets.
• Private Sector: U.S. and regional companies in semiconductors, mining, and manufacturing, encouraged to invest in diversified projects.
• International Organizations: Organization of American States, aiding negotiations and regulatory alignment.
• Broader Groups: Semiconductor users (e.g., tech, automotive industries) and populations in supported countries, gaining from economic development and technology access.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Legal: Builds on existing laws like the CHIPS Act and BUILD Act, ensuring compliance with World Bank income classifications and congressional oversight to prevent misuse of funds. The presidential certification mechanism provides executive flexibility while maintaining checks and balances.
• Constitutional: Aligns with Congress's powers over foreign commerce and appropriations, promoting national security without infringing on treaty-making authority.
• Political: Emphasizes countering "strategic competitors" (implying nations like China), which could heighten geopolitical tensions but also unify U.S. allies in the hemisphere. It promotes "absorptive capacity" (a country's ability to handle investments), avoiding overreach that might strain relations or lead to uneven development.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

Cosponsors (2)

Rep. Johnson, Dusty [R-SD-At Large], Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]

Recent Actions

• 2025-02-11: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
• 2025-02-11: Introduced in House
• 2025-02-11: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025 — issued 2025-02-11 — PDF (6 pages)