Fourth Amendment Restoration Act

Bill Number

H.R. 117

Origin Chamber

House

Congress

119th Congress, Session 1

Policy Area

Armed Forces and National Security

Status

Introduced

Latest Action

2025-01-03: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

Last Updated

2025-01-31T18:48:17Z

AI-Generated Summary

Purpose

The Fourth Amendment Restoration Act (H.R. 117) aims to repeal the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, which governs how the U.S. government conducts surveillance for national security purposes. The bill seeks to enhance privacy protections for U.S. citizens by requiring stricter judicial oversight—specifically, warrants issued under standard criminal procedures—for any surveillance targeting them, thereby aligning intelligence activities more closely with Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Key Provisions

• Repeal of FISA: Completely eliminates FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), which previously allowed secret surveillance warrants from a specialized court for foreign intelligence purposes.
• Definitions: Clarifies key terms, including:
• Pen register and trap and trace device: Tools that record phone numbers dialed or incoming calls (as defined in federal criminal law).
• U.S. citizen: Any individual who is a citizen of the United States.
• Foreign intelligence information: Data related to threats from foreign powers, such as attacks, terrorism, sabotage, or weapons proliferation, or information vital to national defense, security, or foreign affairs (with added protections if it involves U.S. citizens).
• Electronic surveillance: Intercepting wire or radio communications or using devices to monitor non-communication information where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., in their home), typically requiring a warrant in criminal cases.
• Wire communication: Any message transmitted via wires, cables, or similar connections by a common carrier (like a phone company).
• Warrant Requirements for U.S. Citizens (Section 4): U.S. government officers must obtain a warrant from a federal court, following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (standard rules for criminal cases, emphasizing probable cause and judicial review), before:
• Conducting electronic surveillance of a U.S. citizen.
• Physically searching premises or property exclusively controlled by a U.S. citizen.
• Using pen registers or trap and trace devices primarily to gather foreign intelligence on a U.S. citizen.
• Demanding production of documents or items related to a U.S. citizen for foreign intelligence.
• Targeting a U.S. citizen to acquire foreign intelligence.
• Additionally, any information about U.S. citizens gathered under Executive Order 12333 (which authorizes certain intelligence activities outside FISA) cannot be used against them in any legal proceeding or investigation.
• Limits on Using Information About U.S. Citizens (Section 5): Data about U.S. citizens obtained while surveilling non-U.S. citizens (e.g., foreigners abroad) cannot be used against those citizens in criminal, civil, or administrative cases or investigations.
• Criminal Penalties (Section 6): Violations, such as unauthorized surveillance or misuse of obtained information, are federal crimes punishable by fines up to $10,000, imprisonment for at least five years, or both. A defense exists if the action was authorized by a valid court warrant. Federal courts have jurisdiction if the offender is a U.S. government employee or officer.

Significant Changes to Existing Law

• Elimination of FISA Framework: Replaces FISA's specialized, secretive court process (which used a lower "probable cause" standard focused on foreign intelligence) with the more rigorous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring individualized warrants based on evidence of criminal activity.
• Bans on Certain Uses of Intelligence Data: Introduces absolute prohibitions on using information from Executive Order 12333 or incidental collection on U.S. citizens in legal actions, which were previously allowed under FISA with some restrictions (e.g., "minimization" procedures to protect privacy).
• Stricter Targeting Rules: Shifts from FISA's allowances for broad surveillance of non-U.S. persons (which could incidentally capture U.S. citizen data) to explicit warrant requirements for any activity touching U.S. citizens, even for foreign intelligence purposes.
• Criminalization of Violations: Establishes new federal crimes with mandatory minimum sentences for unauthorized actions, expanding beyond FISA's civil penalties and limited criminal provisions.

Potential Impacts

• On Government Agencies: Intelligence and law enforcement agencies (e.g., NSA, FBI) would face significant restrictions on surveillance tools, potentially slowing foreign intelligence gathering if it involves U.S. citizens or their communications. This could require agencies to seek traditional criminal warrants more often, increasing administrative burdens and court involvement.
• On Citizens: U.S. citizens would gain stronger privacy protections, reducing the risk of warrantless or secret monitoring for national security reasons. However, it might limit government ability to detect threats involving citizens, indirectly affecting public safety.
• On International Relations: Could complicate U.S. intelligence-sharing with allies or monitoring of foreign threats, as operations targeting non-U.S. persons might yield unusable data on Americans. No direct impact on foreign entities, but it signals a U.S. policy shift toward prioritizing domestic privacy over expansive surveillance.

Main Stakeholders Affected

• U.S. Citizens: Primary beneficiaries through enhanced privacy and limits on government overreach.
• Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies: Including the NSA, FBI, and Department of Justice, which would lose key authorities and face new compliance hurdles.
• Federal Courts: Increased workload from handling warrant applications under criminal rules instead of the streamlined FISA process.
• Congress and Oversight Bodies: The bill's referral to the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees highlights their role in balancing security and civil liberties; passage would require congressional reauthorization of any alternative surveillance laws.
• Telecommunications and Tech Companies: Potentially affected by changes in how they must respond to government requests for data, as warrant requirements become stricter.

Notable Legal, Constitutional, or Political Implications

• Constitutional: Strongly reinforces the Fourth Amendment by mandating warrants for searches involving U.S. citizens, addressing criticisms that FISA allowed "backdoor" surveillance bypassing traditional protections. It emphasizes "reasonable expectation of privacy" (a key Supreme Court concept) in defining surveillance.
• Legal: Shifts jurisdiction from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to open federal courts, promoting transparency but potentially exposing sensitive operations. The bill preserves some existing criminal surveillance laws (e.g., under Title 18 or 50 U.S.C. § 1812) as alternatives, avoiding a total vacuum in intelligence capabilities.
• Political: Introduced by Rep. Biggs (R-AZ) in the 119th Congress, it reflects ongoing debates on surveillance reform post-Snowden leaks and FISA Section 702 renewals. Passage could polarize views on national security versus civil liberties, influencing future legislation like the USA FREEDOM Act reauthorizations, but its outright repeal makes it a bold, likely contentious proposal requiring bipartisan support.

This summary was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies. Refer to the official source document for the authoritative text.

Sponsor

Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

Recent Actions

• 2025-01-03: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-03: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
• 2025-01-03: Introduced in House
• 2025-01-03: Introduced in House

Bill Versions

• Fourth Amendment Restoration Act — issued 2025-01-03 — PDF (7 pages)